denoland-deno/.github/SECURITY.md

# Security Policy

Thank you for taking the time to investigate the security of Deno. The security
of Deno is our topmost priority. We appreciate investigative work into system
security by well-intentioned, ethical security researchers. If you discover a
vulnerability, however small, we would like to know about it to address it with
appropriate measures as quickly as possible. This document outlines the method
we use to work with the security research community to address runtime security.

## Reporting a vulnerability

Please email findings to security@deno.com. We strive to resolve all problems as
quickly as possible, and are more than happy to play an active role in
publication of writeups after the problem is resolved.

Try to include as much information as possible in the initial email, so we can
quickly address the issue.

**Please do not open security issues in the public issue tracker.**

### Please do the following

- Do not take advantage of the vulnerability or problem you have discovered.
- Do not publish or reveal the problem until it has been resolved.
- Do not use attacks on physical security or applications of third parties.
- Do provide sufficient information to reproduce the problem, so we will be able
  to resolve it as quickly as possible. Usually, a list of steps to follow, and
  the vulnerable Deno version is enough. More complex vulnerabilities may
  require further explanation.

### Our commitment to you

- If you act in accordance with this policy, we will not take legal action
  against you in regard to your report.
- We will handle your report with strict confidentiality, and not pass on your
  personal details to third parties without your permission.

## Security Model

The following paragraphs outline the rough security model for Deno. The model
may change slightly over time, but in general the model is as follows:

- All JavaScript run in Deno is considered untrusted, so permissions are thus
  never enforced in JavaScript.
- All JavaScript run in a single Deno process is considered to be part of the
  same program and is not isolated from itself. This means that Deno does not
  guarantee that values set by one JS module will be inaccessible to another, or
  that a value set in one web worker can not be accessed by another.
- All runtime I/O is considered to be privileged and must always be guarded by a
  runtime permission. This includes filesystem access, network access, etc.
  - The only exception to this is runtime storage explosion attacks that are
    isolated to a part of the file system, caused by evaluated code (for
    example, caching big dependencies or no limits on runtime caches such as the
    [Web Cache](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Cache) API).
- Users should not be able to self-escalate their permissions without explicit
  consent.
- I/O required to build an initial static module graph should always follow the
  permissions of its parent. If there is no parent, all permissions are granted.
  As an example, this means that the initial static module graph that is
  constructed when doing `deno run`, does not have any permission restrictions.
  However, the module graph constructed as the result of loading a web worker or
  dynamic import will be restricted to the permissions of the caller (the main
  worker most likely).
- We consider the V8 VM to be a secure sandbox.