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denoland-deno/ext/fetch/proxy.rs

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// Copyright 2018-2024 the Deno authors. All rights reserved. MIT license.
//! Parts of this module should be able to be replaced with other crates
//! eventually, once generic versions appear in hyper-util, et al.
use std::env;
use std::future::Future;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::pin::Pin;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::task::Context;
use std::task::Poll;
use deno_core::futures::TryFutureExt;
use deno_tls::rustls::ClientConfig as TlsConfig;
use http::header::HeaderValue;
use http::uri::Scheme;
use http::Uri;
use hyper_rustls::HttpsConnector;
use hyper_rustls::MaybeHttpsStream;
use hyper_util::client::legacy::connect::Connected;
use hyper_util::client::legacy::connect::Connection;
use hyper_util::rt::TokioIo;
use ipnet::IpNet;
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
use tokio_rustls::client::TlsStream;
use tokio_rustls::TlsConnector;
use tokio_socks::tcp::Socks5Stream;
use tower_service::Service;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub(crate) struct ProxyConnector<C> {
pub(crate) http: C,
pub(crate) proxies: Arc<Proxies>,
/// TLS config when destination is not a proxy
pub(crate) tls: Arc<TlsConfig>,
/// TLS config when destination is a proxy
/// Notably, does not include ALPN
pub(crate) tls_proxy: Arc<TlsConfig>,
pub(crate) user_agent: Option<HeaderValue>,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct Proxies {
no: Option<NoProxy>,
intercepts: Vec<Intercept>,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
pub(crate) struct Intercept {
filter: Filter,
target: Target,
}
#[derive(Clone)]
enum Target {
Http {
dst: Uri,
auth: Option<HeaderValue>,
},
Https {
dst: Uri,
auth: Option<HeaderValue>,
},
Socks {
dst: Uri,
auth: Option<(String, String)>,
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
enum Filter {
Http,
Https,
All,
}
pub(crate) fn from_env() -> Proxies {
let mut intercepts = Vec::new();
if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("ALL_PROXY", Filter::All) {
intercepts.push(proxy);
} else if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("all_proxy", Filter::All) {
intercepts.push(proxy);
}
if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("HTTPS_PROXY", Filter::Https) {
intercepts.push(proxy);
} else if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("https_proxy", Filter::Https) {
intercepts.push(proxy);
}
// In a CGI context, headers become environment variables. So, "Proxy:" becomes HTTP_PROXY.
// To prevent an attacker from injecting a proxy, check if we are in CGI.
if env::var_os("REQUEST_METHOD").is_none() {
if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("HTTP_PROXY", Filter::Http) {
intercepts.push(proxy);
} else if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("http_proxy", Filter::Https) {
intercepts.push(proxy);
}
}
let no = NoProxy::from_env();
Proxies { intercepts, no }
}
pub fn basic_auth(user: &str, pass: Option<&str>) -> HeaderValue {
use base64::prelude::BASE64_STANDARD;
use base64::write::EncoderWriter;
use std::io::Write;
let mut buf = b"Basic ".to_vec();
{
let mut encoder = EncoderWriter::new(&mut buf, &BASE64_STANDARD);
let _ = write!(encoder, "{user}:");
if let Some(password) = pass {
let _ = write!(encoder, "{password}");
}
}
let mut header =
HeaderValue::from_bytes(&buf).expect("base64 is always valid HeaderValue");
header.set_sensitive(true);
header
}
fn parse_env_var(name: &str, filter: Filter) -> Option<Intercept> {
let val = env::var(name).ok()?;
let target = Target::parse(&val)?;
Some(Intercept { filter, target })
}
impl Intercept {
pub(crate) fn all(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
let target = Target::parse(s)?;
Some(Intercept {
filter: Filter::All,
target,
})
}
pub(crate) fn set_auth(&mut self, user: &str, pass: &str) {
match self.target {
Target::Http { ref mut auth, .. } => {
*auth = Some(basic_auth(user, Some(pass)));
}
Target::Https { ref mut auth, .. } => {
*auth = Some(basic_auth(user, Some(pass)));
}
Target::Socks { ref mut auth, .. } => {
*auth = Some((user.into(), pass.into()));
}
}
}
}
impl std::fmt::Debug for Intercept {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("Intercept")
.field("filter", &self.filter)
.finish()
}
}
impl Target {
fn parse(val: &str) -> Option<Self> {
let uri = val.parse::<Uri>().ok()?;
let mut builder = Uri::builder();
let mut is_socks = false;
let mut http_auth = None;
let mut socks_auth = None;
builder = builder.scheme(match uri.scheme() {
Some(s) => {
if s == &Scheme::HTTP || s == &Scheme::HTTPS {
s.clone()
} else if s.as_str() == "socks5" || s.as_str() == "socks5h" {
is_socks = true;
s.clone()
} else {
// can't use this proxy scheme
return None;
}
}
// if no scheme provided, assume they meant 'http'
None => Scheme::HTTP,
});
let authority = uri.authority()?;
if let Some((userinfo, host_port)) = authority.as_str().split_once('@') {
let (user, pass) = userinfo.split_once(':')?;
if is_socks {
socks_auth = Some((user.into(), pass.into()));
} else {
http_auth = Some(basic_auth(user, Some(pass)));
}
builder = builder.authority(host_port);
} else {
builder = builder.authority(authority.clone());
}
// removing any path, but we MUST specify one or the builder errors
builder = builder.path_and_query("/");
let dst = builder.build().ok()?;
let target = match dst.scheme().unwrap().as_str() {
"https" => Target::Https {
dst,
auth: http_auth,
},
"http" => Target::Http {
dst,
auth: http_auth,
},
"socks5" | "socks5h" => Target::Socks {
dst,
auth: socks_auth,
},
// shouldn't happen
_ => return None,
};
Some(target)
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct NoProxy {
domains: DomainMatcher,
ips: IpMatcher,
}
/// Represents a possible matching entry for an IP address
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
enum Ip {
Address(IpAddr),
Network(IpNet),
}
/// A wrapper around a list of IP cidr blocks or addresses with a [IpMatcher::contains] method for
/// checking if an IP address is contained within the matcher
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)]
struct IpMatcher(Vec<Ip>);
/// A wrapper around a list of domains with a [DomainMatcher::contains] method for checking if a
/// domain is contained within the matcher
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)]
struct DomainMatcher(Vec<String>);
impl NoProxy {
/// Returns a new no-proxy configuration based on environment variables (or `None` if no variables are set)
/// see [self::NoProxy::from_string()] for the string format
fn from_env() -> Option<NoProxy> {
let raw = env::var("NO_PROXY")
.or_else(|_| env::var("no_proxy"))
.unwrap_or_default();
Self::from_string(&raw)
}
/// Returns a new no-proxy configuration based on a `no_proxy` string (or `None` if no variables
/// are set)
/// The rules are as follows:
/// * The environment variable `NO_PROXY` is checked, if it is not set, `no_proxy` is checked
/// * If neither environment variable is set, `None` is returned
/// * Entries are expected to be comma-separated (whitespace between entries is ignored)
/// * IP addresses (both IPv4 and IPv6) are allowed, as are optional subnet masks (by adding /size,
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/// for example "`192.168.1.0/24`").
/// * An entry "`*`" matches all hostnames (this is the only wildcard allowed)
/// * Any other entry is considered a domain name (and may contain a leading dot, for example `google.com`
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/// and `.google.com` are equivalent) and would match both that domain AND all subdomains.
///
/// For example, if `"NO_PROXY=google.com, 192.168.1.0/24"` was set, all of the following would match
/// (and therefore would bypass the proxy):
/// * `http://google.com/`
/// * `http://www.google.com/`
/// * `http://192.168.1.42/`
///
/// The URL `http://notgoogle.com/` would not match.
fn from_string(no_proxy_list: &str) -> Option<Self> {
if no_proxy_list.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let mut ips = Vec::new();
let mut domains = Vec::new();
let parts = no_proxy_list.split(',').map(str::trim);
for part in parts {
match part.parse::<IpNet>() {
// If we can parse an IP net or address, then use it, otherwise, assume it is a domain
Ok(ip) => ips.push(Ip::Network(ip)),
Err(_) => match part.parse::<IpAddr>() {
Ok(addr) => ips.push(Ip::Address(addr)),
Err(_) => domains.push(part.to_owned()),
},
}
}
Some(NoProxy {
ips: IpMatcher(ips),
domains: DomainMatcher(domains),
})
}
fn contains(&self, host: &str) -> bool {
// According to RFC3986, raw IPv6 hosts will be wrapped in []. So we need to strip those off
// the end in order to parse correctly
let host = if host.starts_with('[') {
let x: &[_] = &['[', ']'];
host.trim_matches(x)
} else {
host
};
match host.parse::<IpAddr>() {
// If we can parse an IP addr, then use it, otherwise, assume it is a domain
Ok(ip) => self.ips.contains(ip),
Err(_) => self.domains.contains(host),
}
}
}
impl IpMatcher {
fn contains(&self, addr: IpAddr) -> bool {
for ip in &self.0 {
match ip {
Ip::Address(address) => {
if &addr == address {
return true;
}
}
Ip::Network(net) => {
if net.contains(&addr) {
return true;
}
}
}
}
false
}
}
impl DomainMatcher {
// The following links may be useful to understand the origin of these rules:
// * https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_NOPROXY.html
// * https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/1208
fn contains(&self, domain: &str) -> bool {
let domain_len = domain.len();
for d in &self.0 {
if d == domain || d.strip_prefix('.') == Some(domain) {
return true;
} else if domain.ends_with(d) {
if d.starts_with('.') {
// If the first character of d is a dot, that means the first character of domain
// must also be a dot, so we are looking at a subdomain of d and that matches
return true;
} else if domain.as_bytes().get(domain_len - d.len() - 1) == Some(&b'.')
{
// Given that d is a prefix of domain, if the prior character in domain is a dot
// then that means we must be matching a subdomain of d, and that matches
return true;
}
} else if d == "*" {
return true;
}
}
false
}
}
impl<C> ProxyConnector<C> {
fn intercept(&self, dst: &Uri) -> Option<&Intercept> {
self.proxies.intercept(dst)
}
}
impl Proxies {
pub(crate) fn prepend(&mut self, intercept: Intercept) {
self.intercepts.insert(0, intercept);
}
pub(crate) fn http_forward_auth(&self, dst: &Uri) -> Option<&HeaderValue> {
let intercept = self.intercept(dst)?;
match intercept.target {
// Only if the proxy target is http
Target::Http { ref auth, .. } => auth.as_ref(),
_ => None,
}
}
fn intercept(&self, dst: &Uri) -> Option<&Intercept> {
if let Some(no_proxy) = self.no.as_ref() {
if no_proxy.contains(dst.host()?) {
return None;
}
}
for intercept in &self.intercepts {
return match (
intercept.filter,
dst.scheme().map(Scheme::as_str).unwrap_or(""),
) {
(Filter::All, _) => Some(intercept),
(Filter::Https, "https") => Some(intercept),
(Filter::Http, "http") => Some(intercept),
_ => continue,
};
}
None
}
}
type BoxFuture<T> = Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = T> + Send>>;
type BoxError = Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>;
// These variatns are not to be inspected.
pub enum Proxied<T> {
/// Not proxied
PassThrough(T),
/// An HTTP forwarding proxy needed absolute-form
HttpForward(T),
/// Tunneled through HTTP CONNECT
HttpTunneled(Box<TokioIo<TlsStream<TokioIo<T>>>>),
/// Tunneled through SOCKS
Socks(TokioIo<TcpStream>),
/// Tunneled through SOCKS and TLS
SocksTls(TokioIo<TlsStream<TokioIo<TokioIo<TcpStream>>>>),
}
impl<C> Service<Uri> for ProxyConnector<C>
where
C: Service<Uri> + Clone,
C::Response:
hyper::rt::Read + hyper::rt::Write + Connection + Unpin + Send + 'static,
C::Future: Send + 'static,
C::Error: Into<BoxError> + 'static,
{
type Response = Proxied<MaybeHttpsStream<C::Response>>;
type Error = BoxError;
type Future = BoxFuture<Result<Self::Response, Self::Error>>;
fn poll_ready(
&mut self,
cx: &mut Context<'_>,
) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
self.http.poll_ready(cx).map_err(Into::into)
}
fn call(&mut self, orig_dst: Uri) -> Self::Future {
if let Some(intercept) = self.intercept(&orig_dst).cloned() {
let is_https = orig_dst.scheme() == Some(&Scheme::HTTPS);
let user_agent = self.user_agent.clone();
return match intercept.target {
Target::Http {
dst: proxy_dst,
auth,
}
| Target::Https {
dst: proxy_dst,
auth,
} => {
let mut connector =
HttpsConnector::from((self.http.clone(), self.tls_proxy.clone()));
let connecting = connector.call(proxy_dst);
let tls = TlsConnector::from(self.tls.clone());
Box::pin(async move {
let mut io = connecting.await.map_err(Into::<BoxError>::into)?;
if is_https {
tunnel(&mut io, &orig_dst, user_agent, auth).await?;
let tokio_io = TokioIo::new(io);
let io = tls
.connect(
TryFrom::try_from(orig_dst.host().unwrap().to_owned())?,
tokio_io,
)
.await?;
Ok(Proxied::HttpTunneled(Box::new(TokioIo::new(io))))
} else {
Ok(Proxied::HttpForward(io))
}
})
}
Target::Socks {
dst: proxy_dst,
auth,
} => {
let tls = TlsConnector::from(self.tls.clone());
Box::pin(async move {
let socks_addr = (
proxy_dst.host().unwrap(),
proxy_dst.port().map(|p| p.as_u16()).unwrap_or(1080),
);
let host = orig_dst.host().ok_or("no host in url")?;
let port = match orig_dst.port() {
Some(p) => p.as_u16(),
None if is_https => 443,
_ => 80,
};
let io = if let Some((user, pass)) = auth {
Socks5Stream::connect_with_password(
socks_addr,
(host, port),
&user,
&pass,
)
.await?
} else {
Socks5Stream::connect(socks_addr, (host, port)).await?
};
let io = TokioIo::new(io.into_inner());
if is_https {
let tokio_io = TokioIo::new(io);
let io = tls
.connect(TryFrom::try_from(host.to_owned())?, tokio_io)
.await?;
Ok(Proxied::SocksTls(TokioIo::new(io)))
} else {
Ok(Proxied::Socks(io))
}
})
}
};
}
let mut connector =
HttpsConnector::from((self.http.clone(), self.tls.clone()));
Box::pin(
connector
.call(orig_dst)
.map_ok(Proxied::PassThrough)
.map_err(Into::into),
)
}
}
async fn tunnel<T>(
io: &mut T,
dst: &Uri,
user_agent: Option<HeaderValue>,
auth: Option<HeaderValue>,
) -> Result<(), BoxError>
where
T: hyper::rt::Read + hyper::rt::Write + Unpin,
{
use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
let host = dst.host().expect("proxy dst has host");
let port = match dst.port() {
Some(p) => p.as_u16(),
None => match dst.scheme().map(Scheme::as_str).unwrap_or("") {
"https" => 443,
"http" => 80,
_ => return Err("proxy dst unexpected scheme".into()),
},
};
let mut buf = format!(
"\
CONNECT {host}:{port} HTTP/1.1\r\n\
Host: {host}:{port}\r\n\
"
)
.into_bytes();
// user-agent
if let Some(user_agent) = user_agent {
buf.extend_from_slice(b"User-Agent: ");
buf.extend_from_slice(user_agent.as_bytes());
buf.extend_from_slice(b"\r\n");
}
// proxy-authorization
if let Some(value) = auth {
buf.extend_from_slice(b"Proxy-Authorization: ");
buf.extend_from_slice(value.as_bytes());
buf.extend_from_slice(b"\r\n");
}
// headers end
buf.extend_from_slice(b"\r\n");
let mut tokio_conn = TokioIo::new(io);
tokio_conn.write_all(&buf).await?;
let mut buf = [0; 8192];
let mut pos = 0;
loop {
let n = tokio_conn.read(&mut buf[pos..]).await?;
if n == 0 {
return Err("unexpected eof while tunneling".into());
}
pos += n;
let recvd = &buf[..pos];
if recvd.starts_with(b"HTTP/1.1 200") || recvd.starts_with(b"HTTP/1.0 200")
{
if recvd.ends_with(b"\r\n\r\n") {
return Ok(());
}
if pos == buf.len() {
return Err("proxy headers too long for tunnel".into());
}
// else read more
} else if recvd.starts_with(b"HTTP/1.1 407") {
return Err("proxy authentication required".into());
} else {
return Err("unsuccessful tunnel".into());
}
}
}
impl<T> hyper::rt::Read for Proxied<T>
where
T: hyper::rt::Read + hyper::rt::Write + Unpin,
{
fn poll_read(
mut self: Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut Context<'_>,
buf: hyper::rt::ReadBufCursor<'_>,
) -> Poll<Result<(), std::io::Error>> {
match *self {
Proxied::PassThrough(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_read(cx, buf),
Proxied::HttpForward(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_read(cx, buf),
Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_read(cx, buf),
Proxied::Socks(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_read(cx, buf),
Proxied::SocksTls(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_read(cx, buf),
}
}
}
impl<T> hyper::rt::Write for Proxied<T>
where
T: hyper::rt::Read + hyper::rt::Write + Unpin,
{
fn poll_write(
mut self: Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut Context<'_>,
buf: &[u8],
) -> Poll<Result<usize, std::io::Error>> {
match *self {
Proxied::PassThrough(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write(cx, buf),
Proxied::HttpForward(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write(cx, buf),
Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write(cx, buf),
Proxied::Socks(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write(cx, buf),
Proxied::SocksTls(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write(cx, buf),
}
}
fn poll_flush(
mut self: Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut Context<'_>,
) -> Poll<Result<(), std::io::Error>> {
match *self {
Proxied::PassThrough(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_flush(cx),
Proxied::HttpForward(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_flush(cx),
Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_flush(cx),
Proxied::Socks(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_flush(cx),
Proxied::SocksTls(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_flush(cx),
}
}
fn poll_shutdown(
mut self: Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut Context<'_>,
) -> Poll<Result<(), std::io::Error>> {
match *self {
Proxied::PassThrough(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_shutdown(cx),
Proxied::HttpForward(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_shutdown(cx),
Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_shutdown(cx),
Proxied::Socks(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_shutdown(cx),
Proxied::SocksTls(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_shutdown(cx),
}
}
fn is_write_vectored(&self) -> bool {
match *self {
Proxied::PassThrough(ref p) => p.is_write_vectored(),
Proxied::HttpForward(ref p) => p.is_write_vectored(),
Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref p) => p.is_write_vectored(),
Proxied::Socks(ref p) => p.is_write_vectored(),
Proxied::SocksTls(ref p) => p.is_write_vectored(),
}
}
fn poll_write_vectored(
mut self: Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut Context<'_>,
bufs: &[std::io::IoSlice<'_>],
) -> Poll<Result<usize, std::io::Error>> {
match *self {
Proxied::PassThrough(ref mut p) => {
Pin::new(p).poll_write_vectored(cx, bufs)
}
Proxied::HttpForward(ref mut p) => {
Pin::new(p).poll_write_vectored(cx, bufs)
}
Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref mut p) => {
Pin::new(p).poll_write_vectored(cx, bufs)
}
Proxied::Socks(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write_vectored(cx, bufs),
Proxied::SocksTls(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write_vectored(cx, bufs),
}
}
}
impl<T> Connection for Proxied<T>
where
T: Connection,
{
fn connected(&self) -> Connected {
match self {
Proxied::PassThrough(ref p) => p.connected(),
Proxied::HttpForward(ref p) => p.connected().proxy(true),
Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref p) => {
let tunneled_tls = p.inner().get_ref();
if tunneled_tls.1.alpn_protocol() == Some(b"h2") {
tunneled_tls.0.connected().negotiated_h2()
} else {
tunneled_tls.0.connected()
}
}
Proxied::Socks(ref p) => p.connected(),
Proxied::SocksTls(ref p) => {
let tunneled_tls = p.inner().get_ref();
if tunneled_tls.1.alpn_protocol() == Some(b"h2") {
tunneled_tls.0.connected().negotiated_h2()
} else {
tunneled_tls.0.connected()
}
}
}
}
}
#[test]
fn test_proxy_parse_from_env() {
fn parse(s: &str) -> Target {
Target::parse(s).unwrap()
}
// normal
match parse("http://127.0.0.1:6666") {
Target::Http { dst, auth } => {
assert_eq!(dst, "http://127.0.0.1:6666");
assert!(auth.is_none());
}
_ => panic!("bad target"),
}
// without scheme
match parse("127.0.0.1:6666") {
Target::Http { dst, auth } => {
assert_eq!(dst, "http://127.0.0.1:6666");
assert!(auth.is_none());
}
_ => panic!("bad target"),
}
// with userinfo
match parse("user:pass@127.0.0.1:6666") {
Target::Http { dst, auth } => {
assert_eq!(dst, "http://127.0.0.1:6666");
assert!(auth.is_some());
assert!(auth.unwrap().is_sensitive());
}
_ => panic!("bad target"),
}
// socks
match parse("socks5://user:pass@127.0.0.1:6666") {
Target::Socks { dst, auth } => {
assert_eq!(dst, "socks5://127.0.0.1:6666");
assert!(auth.is_some());
}
_ => panic!("bad target"),
}
// socks5h
match parse("socks5h://localhost:6666") {
Target::Socks { dst, auth } => {
assert_eq!(dst, "socks5h://localhost:6666");
assert!(auth.is_none());
}
_ => panic!("bad target"),
}
}
#[test]
fn test_domain_matcher() {
let domains = vec![".foo.bar".into(), "bar.foo".into()];
let matcher = DomainMatcher(domains);
// domains match with leading `.`
assert!(matcher.contains("foo.bar"));
// subdomains match with leading `.`
assert!(matcher.contains("www.foo.bar"));
// domains match with no leading `.`
assert!(matcher.contains("bar.foo"));
// subdomains match with no leading `.`
assert!(matcher.contains("www.bar.foo"));
// non-subdomain string prefixes don't match
assert!(!matcher.contains("notfoo.bar"));
assert!(!matcher.contains("notbar.foo"));
}
#[test]
fn test_no_proxy_wildcard() {
let no_proxy = NoProxy::from_string("*").unwrap();
assert!(no_proxy.contains("any.where"));
}
#[test]
fn test_no_proxy_ip_ranges() {
let no_proxy = NoProxy::from_string(
".foo.bar, bar.baz,10.42.1.1/24,::1,10.124.7.8,2001::/17",
)
.unwrap();
let should_not_match = [
// random url, not in no_proxy
"deno.com",
// make sure that random non-subdomain string prefixes don't match
"notfoo.bar",
// make sure that random non-subdomain string prefixes don't match
"notbar.baz",
// ipv4 address out of range
"10.43.1.1",
// ipv4 address out of range
"10.124.7.7",
// ipv6 address out of range
"[ffff:db8:a0b:12f0::1]",
// ipv6 address out of range
"[2005:db8:a0b:12f0::1]",
];
for host in &should_not_match {
assert!(!no_proxy.contains(host), "should not contain {:?}", host);
}
let should_match = [
// make sure subdomains (with leading .) match
"hello.foo.bar",
// make sure exact matches (without leading .) match (also makes sure spaces between entries work)
"bar.baz",
// make sure subdomains (without leading . in no_proxy) match
"foo.bar.baz",
// make sure subdomains (without leading . in no_proxy) match - this differs from cURL
"foo.bar",
// ipv4 address match within range
"10.42.1.100",
// ipv6 address exact match
"[::1]",
// ipv6 address match within range
"[2001:db8:a0b:12f0::1]",
// ipv4 address exact match
"10.124.7.8",
];
for host in &should_match {
assert!(no_proxy.contains(host), "should contain {:?}", host);
}
}