// Copyright 2018-2019 the Deno authors. All rights reserved. MIT license. use crate::deno_error::permission_denied_msg; use crate::flags::DenoFlags; use ansi_term::Style; use deno::ErrBox; use log; use std::collections::HashSet; use std::fmt; use std::path::PathBuf; use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; use std::sync::Arc; const PERMISSION_EMOJI: &str = "⚠️"; /// Tri-state value for storing permission state pub enum PermissionAccessorState { Allow = 0, Ask = 1, Deny = 2, } impl From for PermissionAccessorState { fn from(val: usize) -> Self { match val { 0 => PermissionAccessorState::Allow, 1 => PermissionAccessorState::Ask, 2 => PermissionAccessorState::Deny, _ => unreachable!(), } } } impl From for PermissionAccessorState { fn from(val: bool) -> Self { if val { PermissionAccessorState::Allow } else { PermissionAccessorState::Ask } } } impl fmt::Display for PermissionAccessorState { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result { match self { PermissionAccessorState::Allow => f.pad("Allow"), PermissionAccessorState::Ask => f.pad("Ask"), PermissionAccessorState::Deny => f.pad("Deny"), } } } #[derive(Debug)] pub struct PermissionAccessor { state: Arc, } impl PermissionAccessor { pub fn new(state: PermissionAccessorState) -> Self { Self { state: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(state as usize)), } } pub fn is_allow(&self) -> bool { match self.get_state() { PermissionAccessorState::Allow => true, _ => false, } } /// If the state is "Allow" walk it back to the default "Ask" /// Don't do anything if state is "Deny" pub fn revoke(&self) { if self.is_allow() { self.ask(); } } pub fn allow(&self) { self.set_state(PermissionAccessorState::Allow) } pub fn ask(&self) { self.set_state(PermissionAccessorState::Ask) } #[inline] pub fn get_state(&self) -> PermissionAccessorState { self.state.load(Ordering::SeqCst).into() } fn set_state(&self, state: PermissionAccessorState) { self.state.store(state as usize, Ordering::SeqCst) } } impl From for PermissionAccessor { fn from(val: bool) -> Self { Self::new(PermissionAccessorState::from(val)) } } impl Default for PermissionAccessor { fn default() -> Self { Self { state: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(PermissionAccessorState::Ask as usize)), } } } #[derive(Debug, Default)] pub struct DenoPermissions { // Keep in sync with src/permissions.ts pub allow_read: PermissionAccessor, pub read_whitelist: Arc>, pub allow_write: PermissionAccessor, pub write_whitelist: Arc>, pub allow_net: PermissionAccessor, pub net_whitelist: Arc>, pub allow_env: PermissionAccessor, pub allow_run: PermissionAccessor, pub allow_hrtime: PermissionAccessor, } impl DenoPermissions { pub fn from_flags(flags: &DenoFlags) -> Self { Self { allow_read: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_read), read_whitelist: Arc::new(flags.read_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect()), allow_write: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_write), write_whitelist: Arc::new( flags.write_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect(), ), allow_net: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_net), net_whitelist: Arc::new(flags.net_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect()), allow_env: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_env), allow_run: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_run), allow_hrtime: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_hrtime), } } pub fn check_run(&self) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { let msg = "access to run a subprocess"; match self.allow_run.get_state() { PermissionAccessorState::Allow => { self.log_perm_access(msg); Ok(()) } PermissionAccessorState::Ask => Err(permission_denied_msg( "run again with the --allow-run flag".to_string(), )), PermissionAccessorState::Deny => Err(permission_denied_msg( "run again with the --allow-run flag".to_string(), )), } } pub fn check_read(&self, filename: &str) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { let msg = &format!("read access to \"{}\"", filename); match self.allow_read.get_state() { PermissionAccessorState::Allow => { self.log_perm_access(msg); Ok(()) } state => { if check_path_white_list(filename, &self.read_whitelist) { self.log_perm_access(msg); Ok(()) } else { match state { PermissionAccessorState::Ask => Err(permission_denied_msg( "run again with the --allow-read flag".to_string(), )), PermissionAccessorState::Deny => Err(permission_denied_msg( "run again with the --allow-read flag".to_string(), )), _ => unreachable!(), } } } } } pub fn check_write(&self, filename: &str) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { let msg = &format!("write access to \"{}\"", filename); match self.allow_write.get_state() { PermissionAccessorState::Allow => { self.log_perm_access(msg); Ok(()) } state => { if check_path_white_list(filename, &self.write_whitelist) { self.log_perm_access(msg); Ok(()) } else { match state { PermissionAccessorState::Ask => Err(permission_denied_msg( "run again with the --allow-write flag".to_string(), )), PermissionAccessorState::Deny => Err(permission_denied_msg( "run again with the --allow-write flag".to_string(), )), _ => unreachable!(), } } } } } pub fn check_net(&self, hostname: &str, port: u16) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { let msg = &format!("network access to \"{}:{}\"", hostname, port); match self.allow_net.get_state() { PermissionAccessorState::Allow => { self.log_perm_access(msg); Ok(()) } _state => { if self.net_whitelist.contains(hostname) || self .net_whitelist .contains(&format!("{}:{}", hostname, port)) { self.log_perm_access(msg); Ok(()) } else { Err(permission_denied_msg( "run again with the --allow-net flag".to_string(), )) } } } } pub fn check_net_url(&self, url: &url::Url) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { let msg = &format!("network access to \"{}\"", url); match self.allow_net.get_state() { PermissionAccessorState::Allow => { self.log_perm_access(msg); Ok(()) } _state => { let host = url.host().unwrap(); let whitelist_result = { if self.net_whitelist.contains(&format!("{}", host)) { true } else { match url.port() { Some(port) => { self.net_whitelist.contains(&format!("{}:{}", host, port)) } None => false, } } }; if whitelist_result { self.log_perm_access(msg); Ok(()) } else { Err(permission_denied_msg( "run again with the --allow-net flag".to_string(), )) } } } } pub fn check_env(&self) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { let msg = "access to environment variables"; match self.allow_env.get_state() { PermissionAccessorState::Allow => { self.log_perm_access(msg); Ok(()) } PermissionAccessorState::Ask => Err(permission_denied_msg( "run again with the --allow-env flag".to_string(), )), PermissionAccessorState::Deny => Err(permission_denied_msg( "run again with the --allow-env flag".to_string(), )), } } fn log_perm_access(&self, message: &str) { if log_enabled!(log::Level::Info) { eprintln!( "{}", Style::new() .bold() .paint(format!("{}️ Granted {}", PERMISSION_EMOJI, message)) ); } } pub fn allows_run(&self) -> bool { self.allow_run.is_allow() } pub fn allows_read(&self) -> bool { self.allow_read.is_allow() } pub fn allows_write(&self) -> bool { self.allow_write.is_allow() } pub fn allows_net(&self) -> bool { self.allow_net.is_allow() } pub fn allows_env(&self) -> bool { self.allow_env.is_allow() } pub fn allows_hrtime(&self) -> bool { self.allow_hrtime.is_allow() } pub fn revoke_run(&self) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { self.allow_run.revoke(); Ok(()) } pub fn revoke_read(&self) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { self.allow_read.revoke(); Ok(()) } pub fn revoke_write(&self) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { self.allow_write.revoke(); Ok(()) } pub fn revoke_net(&self) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { self.allow_net.revoke(); Ok(()) } pub fn revoke_env(&self) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { self.allow_env.revoke(); Ok(()) } pub fn revoke_hrtime(&self) -> Result<(), ErrBox> { self.allow_hrtime.revoke(); Ok(()) } } fn check_path_white_list( filename: &str, white_list: &Arc>, ) -> bool { let mut path_buf = PathBuf::from(filename); loop { if white_list.contains(path_buf.to_str().unwrap()) { return true; } if !path_buf.pop() { break; } } false } #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; // Creates vector of strings, Vec macro_rules! svec { ($($x:expr),*) => (vec![$($x.to_string()),*]); } #[test] fn check_paths() { let whitelist = svec!["/a/specific/dir/name", "/a/specific", "/b/c"]; let perms = DenoPermissions::from_flags(&DenoFlags { read_whitelist: whitelist.clone(), write_whitelist: whitelist.clone(), ..Default::default() }); // Inside of /a/specific and /a/specific/dir/name assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/dir/name").is_ok()); assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/dir/name").is_ok()); // Inside of /a/specific but outside of /a/specific/dir/name assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/dir").is_ok()); assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/dir").is_ok()); // Inside of /a/specific and /a/specific/dir/name assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/dir/name/inner").is_ok()); assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/dir/name/inner").is_ok()); // Inside of /a/specific but outside of /a/specific/dir/name assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/other/dir").is_ok()); assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/other/dir").is_ok()); // Exact match with /b/c assert!(perms.check_read("/b/c").is_ok()); assert!(perms.check_write("/b/c").is_ok()); // Sub path within /b/c assert!(perms.check_read("/b/c/sub/path").is_ok()); assert!(perms.check_write("/b/c/sub/path").is_ok()); // Inside of /b but outside of /b/c assert!(perms.check_read("/b/e").is_err()); assert!(perms.check_write("/b/e").is_err()); // Inside of /a but outside of /a/specific assert!(perms.check_read("/a/b").is_err()); assert!(perms.check_write("/a/b").is_err()); } #[test] fn test_check_net() { let perms = DenoPermissions::from_flags(&DenoFlags { net_whitelist: svec![ "localhost", "deno.land", "github.com:3000", "127.0.0.1", "172.16.0.2:8000" ], ..Default::default() }); let domain_tests = vec![ ("localhost", 1234, true), ("deno.land", 0, true), ("deno.land", 3000, true), ("deno.lands", 0, false), ("deno.lands", 3000, false), ("github.com", 3000, true), ("github.com", 0, false), ("github.com", 2000, false), ("github.net", 3000, false), ("127.0.0.1", 0, true), ("127.0.0.1", 3000, true), ("127.0.0.2", 0, false), ("127.0.0.2", 3000, false), ("172.16.0.2", 8000, true), ("172.16.0.2", 0, false), ("172.16.0.2", 6000, false), ("172.16.0.1", 8000, false), // Just some random hosts that should err ("somedomain", 0, false), ("192.168.0.1", 0, false), ]; let url_tests = vec![ // Any protocol + port for localhost should be ok, since we don't specify ("http://localhost", true), ("https://localhost", true), ("https://localhost:4443", true), ("tcp://localhost:5000", true), ("udp://localhost:6000", true), // Correct domain + any port and protocol should be ok incorrect shouldn't ("https://deno.land/std/example/welcome.ts", true), ("https://deno.land:3000/std/example/welcome.ts", true), ("https://deno.lands/std/example/welcome.ts", false), ("https://deno.lands:3000/std/example/welcome.ts", false), // Correct domain + port should be ok all other combinations should err ("https://github.com:3000/denoland/deno", true), ("https://github.com/denoland/deno", false), ("https://github.com:2000/denoland/deno", false), ("https://github.net:3000/denoland/deno", false), // Correct ipv4 address + any port should be ok others should err ("tcp://127.0.0.1", true), ("https://127.0.0.1", true), ("tcp://127.0.0.1:3000", true), ("https://127.0.0.1:3000", true), ("tcp://127.0.0.2", false), ("https://127.0.0.2", false), ("tcp://127.0.0.2:3000", false), ("https://127.0.0.2:3000", false), // Correct address + port should be ok all other combinations should err ("tcp://172.16.0.2:8000", true), ("https://172.16.0.2:8000", true), ("tcp://172.16.0.2", false), ("https://172.16.0.2", false), ("tcp://172.16.0.2:6000", false), ("https://172.16.0.2:6000", false), ("tcp://172.16.0.1:8000", false), ("https://172.16.0.1:8000", false), ]; for (url_str, is_ok) in url_tests.iter() { let u = url::Url::parse(url_str).unwrap(); assert_eq!(*is_ok, perms.check_net_url(&u).is_ok()); } for (host, port, is_ok) in domain_tests.iter() { assert_eq!(*is_ok, perms.check_net(host, *port).is_ok()); } } }