// Copyright 2018-2024 the Deno authors. All rights reserved. MIT license. //! Parts of this module should be able to be replaced with other crates //! eventually, once generic versions appear in hyper-util, et al. use std::env; use std::future::Future; use std::net::IpAddr; use std::pin::Pin; use std::sync::Arc; use std::task::Context; use std::task::Poll; use deno_core::futures::TryFutureExt; use deno_tls::rustls::ClientConfig as TlsConfig; use http::header::HeaderValue; use http::uri::Scheme; use http::Uri; use hyper_rustls::HttpsConnector; use hyper_rustls::MaybeHttpsStream; use hyper_util::client::legacy::connect::Connected; use hyper_util::client::legacy::connect::Connection; use hyper_util::rt::TokioIo; use ipnet::IpNet; use tokio::net::TcpStream; use tokio_rustls::client::TlsStream; use tokio_rustls::TlsConnector; use tokio_socks::tcp::Socks5Stream; use tower_service::Service; #[derive(Debug, Clone)] pub(crate) struct ProxyConnector { pub(crate) http: C, pub(crate) proxies: Arc, /// TLS config when destination is not a proxy pub(crate) tls: Arc, /// TLS config when destination is a proxy /// Notably, does not include ALPN pub(crate) tls_proxy: Arc, pub(crate) user_agent: Option, } #[derive(Debug)] pub(crate) struct Proxies { no: Option, intercepts: Vec, } #[derive(Clone)] pub(crate) struct Intercept { filter: Filter, target: Target, } #[derive(Clone)] enum Target { Http { dst: Uri, auth: Option, }, Https { dst: Uri, auth: Option, }, Socks { dst: Uri, auth: Option<(String, String)>, }, } #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)] enum Filter { Http, Https, All, } pub(crate) fn from_env() -> Proxies { let mut intercepts = Vec::new(); if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("ALL_PROXY", Filter::All) { intercepts.push(proxy); } else if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("all_proxy", Filter::All) { intercepts.push(proxy); } if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("HTTPS_PROXY", Filter::Https) { intercepts.push(proxy); } else if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("https_proxy", Filter::Https) { intercepts.push(proxy); } // In a CGI context, headers become environment variables. So, "Proxy:" becomes HTTP_PROXY. // To prevent an attacker from injecting a proxy, check if we are in CGI. if env::var_os("REQUEST_METHOD").is_none() { if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("HTTP_PROXY", Filter::Http) { intercepts.push(proxy); } else if let Some(proxy) = parse_env_var("http_proxy", Filter::Https) { intercepts.push(proxy); } } let no = NoProxy::from_env(); Proxies { intercepts, no } } pub fn basic_auth(user: &str, pass: Option<&str>) -> HeaderValue { use base64::prelude::BASE64_STANDARD; use base64::write::EncoderWriter; use std::io::Write; let mut buf = b"Basic ".to_vec(); { let mut encoder = EncoderWriter::new(&mut buf, &BASE64_STANDARD); let _ = write!(encoder, "{user}:"); if let Some(password) = pass { let _ = write!(encoder, "{password}"); } } let mut header = HeaderValue::from_bytes(&buf).expect("base64 is always valid HeaderValue"); header.set_sensitive(true); header } fn parse_env_var(name: &str, filter: Filter) -> Option { let val = env::var(name).ok()?; let target = Target::parse(&val)?; Some(Intercept { filter, target }) } impl Intercept { pub(crate) fn all(s: &str) -> Option { let target = Target::parse(s)?; Some(Intercept { filter: Filter::All, target, }) } pub(crate) fn set_auth(&mut self, user: &str, pass: &str) { match self.target { Target::Http { ref mut auth, .. } => { *auth = Some(basic_auth(user, Some(pass))); } Target::Https { ref mut auth, .. } => { *auth = Some(basic_auth(user, Some(pass))); } Target::Socks { ref mut auth, .. } => { *auth = Some((user.into(), pass.into())); } } } } impl std::fmt::Debug for Intercept { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { f.debug_struct("Intercept") .field("filter", &self.filter) .finish() } } impl Target { fn parse(val: &str) -> Option { let uri = val.parse::().ok()?; let mut builder = Uri::builder(); let mut is_socks = false; let mut http_auth = None; let mut socks_auth = None; builder = builder.scheme(match uri.scheme() { Some(s) => { if s == &Scheme::HTTP || s == &Scheme::HTTPS { s.clone() } else if s.as_str() == "socks5" || s.as_str() == "socks5h" { is_socks = true; s.clone() } else { // can't use this proxy scheme return None; } } // if no scheme provided, assume they meant 'http' None => Scheme::HTTP, }); let authority = uri.authority()?; if let Some((userinfo, host_port)) = authority.as_str().split_once('@') { let (user, pass) = userinfo.split_once(':')?; if is_socks { socks_auth = Some((user.into(), pass.into())); } else { http_auth = Some(basic_auth(user, Some(pass))); } builder = builder.authority(host_port); } else { builder = builder.authority(authority.clone()); } // removing any path, but we MUST specify one or the builder errors builder = builder.path_and_query("/"); let dst = builder.build().ok()?; let target = match dst.scheme().unwrap().as_str() { "https" => Target::Https { dst, auth: http_auth, }, "http" => Target::Http { dst, auth: http_auth, }, "socks5" | "socks5h" => Target::Socks { dst, auth: socks_auth, }, // shouldn't happen _ => return None, }; Some(target) } } #[derive(Debug)] struct NoProxy { domains: DomainMatcher, ips: IpMatcher, } /// Represents a possible matching entry for an IP address #[derive(Clone, Debug)] enum Ip { Address(IpAddr), Network(IpNet), } /// A wrapper around a list of IP cidr blocks or addresses with a [IpMatcher::contains] method for /// checking if an IP address is contained within the matcher #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)] struct IpMatcher(Vec); /// A wrapper around a list of domains with a [DomainMatcher::contains] method for checking if a /// domain is contained within the matcher #[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)] struct DomainMatcher(Vec); impl NoProxy { /// Returns a new no-proxy configuration based on environment variables (or `None` if no variables are set) /// see [self::NoProxy::from_string()] for the string format fn from_env() -> Option { let raw = env::var("NO_PROXY") .or_else(|_| env::var("no_proxy")) .unwrap_or_default(); Self::from_string(&raw) } /// Returns a new no-proxy configuration based on a `no_proxy` string (or `None` if no variables /// are set) /// The rules are as follows: /// * The environment variable `NO_PROXY` is checked, if it is not set, `no_proxy` is checked /// * If neither environment variable is set, `None` is returned /// * Entries are expected to be comma-separated (whitespace between entries is ignored) /// * IP addresses (both IPv4 and IPv6) are allowed, as are optional subnet masks (by adding /size, /// for example "`192.168.1.0/24`"). /// * An entry "`*`" matches all hostnames (this is the only wildcard allowed) /// * Any other entry is considered a domain name (and may contain a leading dot, for example `google.com` /// and `.google.com` are equivalent) and would match both that domain AND all subdomains. /// /// For example, if `"NO_PROXY=google.com, 192.168.1.0/24"` was set, all of the following would match /// (and therefore would bypass the proxy): /// * `http://google.com/` /// * `http://www.google.com/` /// * `http://192.168.1.42/` /// /// The URL `http://notgoogle.com/` would not match. fn from_string(no_proxy_list: &str) -> Option { if no_proxy_list.is_empty() { return None; } let mut ips = Vec::new(); let mut domains = Vec::new(); let parts = no_proxy_list.split(',').map(str::trim); for part in parts { match part.parse::() { // If we can parse an IP net or address, then use it, otherwise, assume it is a domain Ok(ip) => ips.push(Ip::Network(ip)), Err(_) => match part.parse::() { Ok(addr) => ips.push(Ip::Address(addr)), Err(_) => domains.push(part.to_owned()), }, } } Some(NoProxy { ips: IpMatcher(ips), domains: DomainMatcher(domains), }) } fn contains(&self, host: &str) -> bool { // According to RFC3986, raw IPv6 hosts will be wrapped in []. So we need to strip those off // the end in order to parse correctly let host = if host.starts_with('[') { let x: &[_] = &['[', ']']; host.trim_matches(x) } else { host }; match host.parse::() { // If we can parse an IP addr, then use it, otherwise, assume it is a domain Ok(ip) => self.ips.contains(ip), Err(_) => self.domains.contains(host), } } } impl IpMatcher { fn contains(&self, addr: IpAddr) -> bool { for ip in &self.0 { match ip { Ip::Address(address) => { if &addr == address { return true; } } Ip::Network(net) => { if net.contains(&addr) { return true; } } } } false } } impl DomainMatcher { // The following links may be useful to understand the origin of these rules: // * https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_NOPROXY.html // * https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/1208 fn contains(&self, domain: &str) -> bool { let domain_len = domain.len(); for d in &self.0 { if d == domain || d.strip_prefix('.') == Some(domain) { return true; } else if domain.ends_with(d) { if d.starts_with('.') { // If the first character of d is a dot, that means the first character of domain // must also be a dot, so we are looking at a subdomain of d and that matches return true; } else if domain.as_bytes().get(domain_len - d.len() - 1) == Some(&b'.') { // Given that d is a prefix of domain, if the prior character in domain is a dot // then that means we must be matching a subdomain of d, and that matches return true; } } else if d == "*" { return true; } } false } } impl ProxyConnector { fn intercept(&self, dst: &Uri) -> Option<&Intercept> { self.proxies.intercept(dst) } } impl Proxies { pub(crate) fn prepend(&mut self, intercept: Intercept) { self.intercepts.insert(0, intercept); } pub(crate) fn http_forward_auth(&self, dst: &Uri) -> Option<&HeaderValue> { let intercept = self.intercept(dst)?; match intercept.target { // Only if the proxy target is http Target::Http { ref auth, .. } => auth.as_ref(), _ => None, } } fn intercept(&self, dst: &Uri) -> Option<&Intercept> { if let Some(no_proxy) = self.no.as_ref() { if no_proxy.contains(dst.host()?) { return None; } } for intercept in &self.intercepts { return match ( intercept.filter, dst.scheme().map(Scheme::as_str).unwrap_or(""), ) { (Filter::All, _) => Some(intercept), (Filter::Https, "https") => Some(intercept), (Filter::Http, "http") => Some(intercept), _ => continue, }; } None } } type BoxFuture = Pin + Send>>; type BoxError = Box; // These variatns are not to be inspected. pub enum Proxied { /// Not proxied PassThrough(T), /// An HTTP forwarding proxy needed absolute-form HttpForward(T), /// Tunneled through HTTP CONNECT HttpTunneled(Box>>>), /// Tunneled through SOCKS Socks(TokioIo), /// Tunneled through SOCKS and TLS SocksTls(TokioIo>>>), } impl Service for ProxyConnector where C: Service + Clone, C::Response: hyper::rt::Read + hyper::rt::Write + Connection + Unpin + Send + 'static, C::Future: Send + 'static, C::Error: Into + 'static, { type Response = Proxied>; type Error = BoxError; type Future = BoxFuture>; fn poll_ready( &mut self, cx: &mut Context<'_>, ) -> Poll> { self.http.poll_ready(cx).map_err(Into::into) } fn call(&mut self, orig_dst: Uri) -> Self::Future { if let Some(intercept) = self.intercept(&orig_dst).cloned() { let is_https = orig_dst.scheme() == Some(&Scheme::HTTPS); let user_agent = self.user_agent.clone(); return match intercept.target { Target::Http { dst: proxy_dst, auth, } | Target::Https { dst: proxy_dst, auth, } => { let mut connector = HttpsConnector::from((self.http.clone(), self.tls_proxy.clone())); let connecting = connector.call(proxy_dst); let tls = TlsConnector::from(self.tls.clone()); Box::pin(async move { let mut io = connecting.await.map_err(Into::::into)?; if is_https { tunnel(&mut io, &orig_dst, user_agent, auth).await?; let tokio_io = TokioIo::new(io); let io = tls .connect( TryFrom::try_from(orig_dst.host().unwrap().to_owned())?, tokio_io, ) .await?; Ok(Proxied::HttpTunneled(Box::new(TokioIo::new(io)))) } else { Ok(Proxied::HttpForward(io)) } }) } Target::Socks { dst: proxy_dst, auth, } => { let tls = TlsConnector::from(self.tls.clone()); Box::pin(async move { let socks_addr = ( proxy_dst.host().unwrap(), proxy_dst.port().map(|p| p.as_u16()).unwrap_or(1080), ); let host = orig_dst.host().ok_or("no host in url")?; let port = match orig_dst.port() { Some(p) => p.as_u16(), None if is_https => 443, _ => 80, }; let io = if let Some((user, pass)) = auth { Socks5Stream::connect_with_password( socks_addr, (host, port), &user, &pass, ) .await? } else { Socks5Stream::connect(socks_addr, (host, port)).await? }; let io = TokioIo::new(io.into_inner()); if is_https { let tokio_io = TokioIo::new(io); let io = tls .connect(TryFrom::try_from(host.to_owned())?, tokio_io) .await?; Ok(Proxied::SocksTls(TokioIo::new(io))) } else { Ok(Proxied::Socks(io)) } }) } }; } let mut connector = HttpsConnector::from((self.http.clone(), self.tls.clone())); Box::pin( connector .call(orig_dst) .map_ok(Proxied::PassThrough) .map_err(Into::into), ) } } async fn tunnel( io: &mut T, dst: &Uri, user_agent: Option, auth: Option, ) -> Result<(), BoxError> where T: hyper::rt::Read + hyper::rt::Write + Unpin, { use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt; use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt; let host = dst.host().expect("proxy dst has host"); let port = match dst.port() { Some(p) => p.as_u16(), None => match dst.scheme().map(Scheme::as_str).unwrap_or("") { "https" => 443, "http" => 80, _ => return Err("proxy dst unexpected scheme".into()), }, }; let mut buf = format!( "\ CONNECT {host}:{port} HTTP/1.1\r\n\ Host: {host}:{port}\r\n\ " ) .into_bytes(); // user-agent if let Some(user_agent) = user_agent { buf.extend_from_slice(b"User-Agent: "); buf.extend_from_slice(user_agent.as_bytes()); buf.extend_from_slice(b"\r\n"); } // proxy-authorization if let Some(value) = auth { buf.extend_from_slice(b"Proxy-Authorization: "); buf.extend_from_slice(value.as_bytes()); buf.extend_from_slice(b"\r\n"); } // headers end buf.extend_from_slice(b"\r\n"); let mut tokio_conn = TokioIo::new(io); tokio_conn.write_all(&buf).await?; let mut buf = [0; 8192]; let mut pos = 0; loop { let n = tokio_conn.read(&mut buf[pos..]).await?; if n == 0 { return Err("unexpected eof while tunneling".into()); } pos += n; let recvd = &buf[..pos]; if recvd.starts_with(b"HTTP/1.1 200") || recvd.starts_with(b"HTTP/1.0 200") { if recvd.ends_with(b"\r\n\r\n") { return Ok(()); } if pos == buf.len() { return Err("proxy headers too long for tunnel".into()); } // else read more } else if recvd.starts_with(b"HTTP/1.1 407") { return Err("proxy authentication required".into()); } else { return Err("unsuccessful tunnel".into()); } } } impl hyper::rt::Read for Proxied where T: hyper::rt::Read + hyper::rt::Write + Unpin, { fn poll_read( mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>, buf: hyper::rt::ReadBufCursor<'_>, ) -> Poll> { match *self { Proxied::PassThrough(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_read(cx, buf), Proxied::HttpForward(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_read(cx, buf), Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_read(cx, buf), Proxied::Socks(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_read(cx, buf), Proxied::SocksTls(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_read(cx, buf), } } } impl hyper::rt::Write for Proxied where T: hyper::rt::Read + hyper::rt::Write + Unpin, { fn poll_write( mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>, buf: &[u8], ) -> Poll> { match *self { Proxied::PassThrough(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write(cx, buf), Proxied::HttpForward(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write(cx, buf), Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write(cx, buf), Proxied::Socks(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write(cx, buf), Proxied::SocksTls(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write(cx, buf), } } fn poll_flush( mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>, ) -> Poll> { match *self { Proxied::PassThrough(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_flush(cx), Proxied::HttpForward(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_flush(cx), Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_flush(cx), Proxied::Socks(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_flush(cx), Proxied::SocksTls(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_flush(cx), } } fn poll_shutdown( mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>, ) -> Poll> { match *self { Proxied::PassThrough(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_shutdown(cx), Proxied::HttpForward(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_shutdown(cx), Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_shutdown(cx), Proxied::Socks(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_shutdown(cx), Proxied::SocksTls(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_shutdown(cx), } } fn is_write_vectored(&self) -> bool { match *self { Proxied::PassThrough(ref p) => p.is_write_vectored(), Proxied::HttpForward(ref p) => p.is_write_vectored(), Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref p) => p.is_write_vectored(), Proxied::Socks(ref p) => p.is_write_vectored(), Proxied::SocksTls(ref p) => p.is_write_vectored(), } } fn poll_write_vectored( mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>, bufs: &[std::io::IoSlice<'_>], ) -> Poll> { match *self { Proxied::PassThrough(ref mut p) => { Pin::new(p).poll_write_vectored(cx, bufs) } Proxied::HttpForward(ref mut p) => { Pin::new(p).poll_write_vectored(cx, bufs) } Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref mut p) => { Pin::new(p).poll_write_vectored(cx, bufs) } Proxied::Socks(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write_vectored(cx, bufs), Proxied::SocksTls(ref mut p) => Pin::new(p).poll_write_vectored(cx, bufs), } } } impl Connection for Proxied where T: Connection, { fn connected(&self) -> Connected { match self { Proxied::PassThrough(ref p) => p.connected(), Proxied::HttpForward(ref p) => p.connected().proxy(true), Proxied::HttpTunneled(ref p) => { let tunneled_tls = p.inner().get_ref(); if tunneled_tls.1.alpn_protocol() == Some(b"h2") { tunneled_tls.0.connected().negotiated_h2() } else { tunneled_tls.0.connected() } } Proxied::Socks(ref p) => p.connected(), Proxied::SocksTls(ref p) => { let tunneled_tls = p.inner().get_ref(); if tunneled_tls.1.alpn_protocol() == Some(b"h2") { tunneled_tls.0.connected().negotiated_h2() } else { tunneled_tls.0.connected() } } } } } #[test] fn test_proxy_parse_from_env() { fn parse(s: &str) -> Target { Target::parse(s).unwrap() } // normal match parse("http://127.0.0.1:6666") { Target::Http { dst, auth } => { assert_eq!(dst, "http://127.0.0.1:6666"); assert!(auth.is_none()); } _ => panic!("bad target"), } // without scheme match parse("127.0.0.1:6666") { Target::Http { dst, auth } => { assert_eq!(dst, "http://127.0.0.1:6666"); assert!(auth.is_none()); } _ => panic!("bad target"), } // with userinfo match parse("user:pass@127.0.0.1:6666") { Target::Http { dst, auth } => { assert_eq!(dst, "http://127.0.0.1:6666"); assert!(auth.is_some()); assert!(auth.unwrap().is_sensitive()); } _ => panic!("bad target"), } // socks match parse("socks5://user:pass@127.0.0.1:6666") { Target::Socks { dst, auth } => { assert_eq!(dst, "socks5://127.0.0.1:6666"); assert!(auth.is_some()); } _ => panic!("bad target"), } // socks5h match parse("socks5h://localhost:6666") { Target::Socks { dst, auth } => { assert_eq!(dst, "socks5h://localhost:6666"); assert!(auth.is_none()); } _ => panic!("bad target"), } } #[test] fn test_domain_matcher() { let domains = vec![".foo.bar".into(), "bar.foo".into()]; let matcher = DomainMatcher(domains); // domains match with leading `.` assert!(matcher.contains("foo.bar")); // subdomains match with leading `.` assert!(matcher.contains("www.foo.bar")); // domains match with no leading `.` assert!(matcher.contains("bar.foo")); // subdomains match with no leading `.` assert!(matcher.contains("www.bar.foo")); // non-subdomain string prefixes don't match assert!(!matcher.contains("notfoo.bar")); assert!(!matcher.contains("notbar.foo")); } #[test] fn test_no_proxy_wildcard() { let no_proxy = NoProxy::from_string("*").unwrap(); assert!(no_proxy.contains("any.where")); } #[test] fn test_no_proxy_ip_ranges() { let no_proxy = NoProxy::from_string( ".foo.bar, bar.baz,10.42.1.1/24,::1,10.124.7.8,2001::/17", ) .unwrap(); let should_not_match = [ // random url, not in no_proxy "deno.com", // make sure that random non-subdomain string prefixes don't match "notfoo.bar", // make sure that random non-subdomain string prefixes don't match "notbar.baz", // ipv4 address out of range "10.43.1.1", // ipv4 address out of range "10.124.7.7", // ipv6 address out of range "[ffff:db8:a0b:12f0::1]", // ipv6 address out of range "[2005:db8:a0b:12f0::1]", ]; for host in &should_not_match { assert!(!no_proxy.contains(host), "should not contain {:?}", host); } let should_match = [ // make sure subdomains (with leading .) match "hello.foo.bar", // make sure exact matches (without leading .) match (also makes sure spaces between entries work) "bar.baz", // make sure subdomains (without leading . in no_proxy) match "foo.bar.baz", // make sure subdomains (without leading . in no_proxy) match - this differs from cURL "foo.bar", // ipv4 address match within range "10.42.1.100", // ipv6 address exact match "[::1]", // ipv6 address match within range "[2001:db8:a0b:12f0::1]", // ipv4 address exact match "10.124.7.8", ]; for host in &should_match { assert!(no_proxy.contains(host), "should contain {:?}", host); } }