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denoland-deno/cli/permissions.rs
Ryan Dahl 3a4d88475b Port code from Cargo and use for progress
A lot of its functionality is unused still, but the goal it to slowly
migrate logging functionality to it. There is also a useful progress bar
which can be ported over later - it depends on this module.

4c1fa54d10/src/cargo/util/progress.rs
2019-06-25 06:32:28 -07:00

636 lines
18 KiB
Rust
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// Copyright 2018-2019 the Deno authors. All rights reserved. MIT license.
use atty;
use crate::flags::DenoFlags;
use ansi_term::Style;
use crate::deno_error::permission_denied;
use crate::deno_error::DenoResult;
use log;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::fmt;
use std::io;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::sync::Arc;
const PERMISSION_EMOJI: &str = "⚠️";
/// Tri-state value for storing permission state
pub enum PermissionAccessorState {
Allow = 0,
Ask = 1,
Deny = 2,
}
impl From<usize> for PermissionAccessorState {
fn from(val: usize) -> Self {
match val {
0 => PermissionAccessorState::Allow,
1 => PermissionAccessorState::Ask,
2 => PermissionAccessorState::Deny,
_ => unreachable!(),
}
}
}
impl From<bool> for PermissionAccessorState {
fn from(val: bool) -> Self {
if val {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow
} else {
PermissionAccessorState::Ask
}
}
}
impl fmt::Display for PermissionAccessorState {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
match self {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow => f.pad("Allow"),
PermissionAccessorState::Ask => f.pad("Ask"),
PermissionAccessorState::Deny => f.pad("Deny"),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct PermissionAccessor {
state: Arc<AtomicUsize>,
}
impl PermissionAccessor {
pub fn new(state: PermissionAccessorState) -> Self {
Self {
state: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(state as usize)),
}
}
pub fn is_allow(&self) -> bool {
match self.get_state() {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow => true,
_ => false,
}
}
/// If the state is "Allow" walk it back to the default "Ask"
/// Don't do anything if state is "Deny"
pub fn revoke(&self) {
if self.is_allow() {
self.ask();
}
}
pub fn allow(&self) {
self.set_state(PermissionAccessorState::Allow)
}
pub fn ask(&self) {
self.set_state(PermissionAccessorState::Ask)
}
pub fn deny(&self) {
self.set_state(PermissionAccessorState::Deny)
}
/// Update this accessors state based on a PromptResult value
/// This will only update the state if the PromptResult value
/// is one of the "Always" values
pub fn update_with_prompt_result(&self, prompt_result: &PromptResult) {
match prompt_result {
PromptResult::AllowAlways => self.allow(),
PromptResult::DenyAlways => self.deny(),
_ => {}
}
}
#[inline]
pub fn get_state(&self) -> PermissionAccessorState {
self.state.load(Ordering::SeqCst).into()
}
fn set_state(&self, state: PermissionAccessorState) {
self.state.store(state as usize, Ordering::SeqCst)
}
}
impl From<bool> for PermissionAccessor {
fn from(val: bool) -> Self {
Self::new(PermissionAccessorState::from(val))
}
}
impl Default for PermissionAccessor {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
state: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(PermissionAccessorState::Ask as usize)),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct DenoPermissions {
// Keep in sync with src/permissions.ts
pub allow_read: PermissionAccessor,
pub read_whitelist: Arc<HashSet<String>>,
pub allow_write: PermissionAccessor,
pub write_whitelist: Arc<HashSet<String>>,
pub allow_net: PermissionAccessor,
pub net_whitelist: Arc<HashSet<String>>,
pub allow_env: PermissionAccessor,
pub allow_run: PermissionAccessor,
pub allow_hrtime: PermissionAccessor,
pub no_prompts: AtomicBool,
}
impl DenoPermissions {
pub fn from_flags(flags: &DenoFlags) -> Self {
Self {
allow_read: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_read),
read_whitelist: Arc::new(flags.read_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect()),
allow_write: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_write),
write_whitelist: Arc::new(
flags.write_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect(),
),
allow_net: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_net),
net_whitelist: Arc::new(flags.net_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect()),
allow_env: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_env),
allow_run: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_run),
allow_hrtime: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_hrtime),
no_prompts: AtomicBool::new(flags.no_prompts),
}
}
pub fn check_run(&self) -> DenoResult<()> {
let msg = "access to run a subprocess";
match self.allow_run.get_state() {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow => {
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
}
PermissionAccessorState::Ask => match self.try_permissions_prompt(msg) {
Err(e) => Err(e),
Ok(v) => {
self.allow_run.update_with_prompt_result(&v);
v.check()?;
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
}
},
PermissionAccessorState::Deny => Err(permission_denied()),
}
}
pub fn check_read(&self, filename: &str) -> DenoResult<()> {
let msg = &format!("read access to \"{}\"", filename);
match self.allow_read.get_state() {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow => {
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
}
state => {
if check_path_white_list(filename, &self.read_whitelist) {
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
} else {
match state {
PermissionAccessorState::Ask => {
match self.try_permissions_prompt(msg) {
Err(e) => Err(e),
Ok(v) => {
self.allow_read.update_with_prompt_result(&v);
v.check()?;
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
}
}
}
PermissionAccessorState::Deny => Err(permission_denied()),
_ => unreachable!(),
}
}
}
}
}
pub fn check_write(&self, filename: &str) -> DenoResult<()> {
let msg = &format!("write access to \"{}\"", filename);
match self.allow_write.get_state() {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow => {
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
}
state => {
if check_path_white_list(filename, &self.write_whitelist) {
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
} else {
match state {
PermissionAccessorState::Ask => {
match self.try_permissions_prompt(msg) {
Err(e) => Err(e),
Ok(v) => {
self.allow_write.update_with_prompt_result(&v);
v.check()?;
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
}
}
}
PermissionAccessorState::Deny => Err(permission_denied()),
_ => unreachable!(),
}
}
}
}
}
pub fn check_net(&self, host_and_port: &str) -> DenoResult<()> {
let msg = &format!("network access to \"{}\"", host_and_port);
match self.allow_net.get_state() {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow => {
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
}
state => {
let parts = host_and_port.split(':').collect::<Vec<&str>>();
if match parts.len() {
2 => {
if self.net_whitelist.contains(parts[0]) {
true
} else {
self
.net_whitelist
.contains(&format!("{}:{}", parts[0], parts[1]))
}
}
1 => self.net_whitelist.contains(parts[0]),
_ => panic!("Failed to parse origin string: {}", host_and_port),
} {
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
} else {
self.check_net_inner(state, msg)
}
}
}
}
pub fn check_net_url(&self, url: url::Url) -> DenoResult<()> {
let msg = &format!("network access to \"{}\"", url);
match self.allow_net.get_state() {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow => {
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
}
state => {
let host = url.host().unwrap();
let whitelist_result = {
if self.net_whitelist.contains(&format!("{}", host)) {
true
} else {
match url.port() {
Some(port) => {
self.net_whitelist.contains(&format!("{}:{}", host, port))
}
None => false,
}
}
};
if whitelist_result {
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
} else {
self.check_net_inner(state, msg)
}
}
}
}
fn check_net_inner(
&self,
state: PermissionAccessorState,
prompt_str: &str,
) -> DenoResult<()> {
match state {
PermissionAccessorState::Ask => {
match self.try_permissions_prompt(prompt_str) {
Err(e) => Err(e),
Ok(v) => {
self.allow_net.update_with_prompt_result(&v);
v.check()?;
self.log_perm_access(prompt_str);
Ok(())
}
}
}
PermissionAccessorState::Deny => Err(permission_denied()),
_ => unreachable!(),
}
}
pub fn check_env(&self) -> DenoResult<()> {
let msg = "access to environment variables";
match self.allow_env.get_state() {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow => {
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
}
PermissionAccessorState::Ask => match self.try_permissions_prompt(msg) {
Err(e) => Err(e),
Ok(v) => {
self.allow_env.update_with_prompt_result(&v);
v.check()?;
self.log_perm_access(msg);
Ok(())
}
},
PermissionAccessorState::Deny => Err(permission_denied()),
}
}
/// Try to present the user with a permission prompt
/// will error with permission_denied if no_prompts is enabled
fn try_permissions_prompt(&self, message: &str) -> DenoResult<PromptResult> {
if self.no_prompts.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
return Err(permission_denied());
}
if !atty::is(atty::Stream::Stdin) || !atty::is(atty::Stream::Stderr) {
return Err(permission_denied());
};
permission_prompt(message)
}
fn log_perm_access(&self, message: &str) {
if log_enabled!(log::Level::Info) {
eprintln!(
"{}",
Style::new()
.bold()
.paint(format!("{} Granted {}", PERMISSION_EMOJI, message))
);
}
}
pub fn allows_run(&self) -> bool {
self.allow_run.is_allow()
}
pub fn allows_read(&self) -> bool {
self.allow_read.is_allow()
}
pub fn allows_write(&self) -> bool {
self.allow_write.is_allow()
}
pub fn allows_net(&self) -> bool {
self.allow_net.is_allow()
}
pub fn allows_env(&self) -> bool {
self.allow_env.is_allow()
}
pub fn allows_hrtime(&self) -> bool {
self.allow_hrtime.is_allow()
}
pub fn revoke_run(&self) -> DenoResult<()> {
self.allow_run.revoke();
Ok(())
}
pub fn revoke_read(&self) -> DenoResult<()> {
self.allow_read.revoke();
Ok(())
}
pub fn revoke_write(&self) -> DenoResult<()> {
self.allow_write.revoke();
Ok(())
}
pub fn revoke_net(&self) -> DenoResult<()> {
self.allow_net.revoke();
Ok(())
}
pub fn revoke_env(&self) -> DenoResult<()> {
self.allow_env.revoke();
Ok(())
}
pub fn revoke_hrtime(&self) -> DenoResult<()> {
self.allow_hrtime.revoke();
Ok(())
}
}
/// Quad-state value for representing user input on permission prompt
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum PromptResult {
AllowAlways = 0,
AllowOnce = 1,
DenyOnce = 2,
DenyAlways = 3,
}
impl PromptResult {
/// If value is any form of deny this will error with permission_denied
pub fn check(&self) -> DenoResult<()> {
match self {
PromptResult::DenyOnce => Err(permission_denied()),
PromptResult::DenyAlways => Err(permission_denied()),
_ => Ok(()),
}
}
}
impl fmt::Display for PromptResult {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
match self {
PromptResult::AllowAlways => f.pad("AllowAlways"),
PromptResult::AllowOnce => f.pad("AllowOnce"),
PromptResult::DenyOnce => f.pad("DenyOnce"),
PromptResult::DenyAlways => f.pad("DenyAlways"),
}
}
}
fn permission_prompt(message: &str) -> DenoResult<PromptResult> {
let msg = format!("{} Deno requests {}. Grant? [a/y/n/d (a = allow always, y = allow once, n = deny once, d = deny always)] ", PERMISSION_EMOJI, message);
// print to stderr so that if deno is > to a file this is still displayed.
eprint!("{}", Style::new().bold().paint(msg));
loop {
let mut input = String::new();
let stdin = io::stdin();
let _nread = stdin.read_line(&mut input)?;
let ch = input.chars().next().unwrap();
match ch.to_ascii_lowercase() {
'a' => return Ok(PromptResult::AllowAlways),
'y' => return Ok(PromptResult::AllowOnce),
'n' => return Ok(PromptResult::DenyOnce),
'd' => return Ok(PromptResult::DenyAlways),
_ => {
// If we don't get a recognized option try again.
let msg_again = format!("Unrecognized option '{}' [a/y/n/d (a = allow always, y = allow once, n = deny once, d = deny always)] ", ch);
eprint!("{}", Style::new().bold().paint(msg_again));
}
};
}
}
fn check_path_white_list(
filename: &str,
white_list: &Arc<HashSet<String>>,
) -> bool {
let mut path_buf = PathBuf::from(filename);
loop {
if white_list.contains(path_buf.to_str().unwrap()) {
return true;
}
if !path_buf.pop() {
break;
}
}
false
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
// Creates vector of strings, Vec<String>
macro_rules! svec {
($($x:expr),*) => (vec![$($x.to_string()),*]);
}
#[test]
fn check_paths() {
let whitelist = svec!["/a/specific/dir/name", "/a/specific", "/b/c"];
let perms = DenoPermissions::from_flags(&DenoFlags {
read_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
write_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
no_prompts: true,
..Default::default()
});
// Inside of /a/specific and /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/dir/name").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/dir/name").is_ok());
// Inside of /a/specific but outside of /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/dir").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/dir").is_ok());
// Inside of /a/specific and /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/dir/name/inner").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/dir/name/inner").is_ok());
// Inside of /a/specific but outside of /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/other/dir").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/other/dir").is_ok());
// Exact match with /b/c
assert!(perms.check_read("/b/c").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/b/c").is_ok());
// Sub path within /b/c
assert!(perms.check_read("/b/c/sub/path").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/b/c/sub/path").is_ok());
// Inside of /b but outside of /b/c
assert!(perms.check_read("/b/e").is_err());
assert!(perms.check_write("/b/e").is_err());
// Inside of /a but outside of /a/specific
assert!(perms.check_read("/a/b").is_err());
assert!(perms.check_write("/a/b").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_check_net() {
let perms = DenoPermissions::from_flags(&DenoFlags {
net_whitelist: svec![
"localhost",
"deno.land",
"github.com:3000",
"127.0.0.1",
"172.16.0.2:8000"
],
no_prompts: true,
..Default::default()
});
let domain_tests = vec![
("localhost:1234", true),
("deno.land", true),
("deno.land:3000", true),
("deno.lands", false),
("deno.lands:3000", false),
("github.com:3000", true),
("github.com", false),
("github.com:2000", false),
("github.net:3000", false),
("127.0.0.1", true),
("127.0.0.1:3000", true),
("127.0.0.2", false),
("127.0.0.2:3000", false),
("172.16.0.2:8000", true),
("172.16.0.2", false),
("172.16.0.2:6000", false),
("172.16.0.1:8000", false),
// Just some random hosts that should err
("somedomain", false),
("192.168.0.1", false),
];
let url_tests = vec![
// Any protocol + port for localhost should be ok, since we don't specify
("http://localhost", true),
("https://localhost", true),
("https://localhost:4443", true),
("tcp://localhost:5000", true),
("udp://localhost:6000", true),
// Correct domain + any port and protocol should be ok incorrect shouldn't
("https://deno.land/std/example/welcome.ts", true),
("https://deno.land:3000/std/example/welcome.ts", true),
("https://deno.lands/std/example/welcome.ts", false),
("https://deno.lands:3000/std/example/welcome.ts", false),
// Correct domain + port should be ok all other combinations should err
("https://github.com:3000/denoland/deno", true),
("https://github.com/denoland/deno", false),
("https://github.com:2000/denoland/deno", false),
("https://github.net:3000/denoland/deno", false),
// Correct ipv4 address + any port should be ok others should err
("tcp://127.0.0.1", true),
("https://127.0.0.1", true),
("tcp://127.0.0.1:3000", true),
("https://127.0.0.1:3000", true),
("tcp://127.0.0.2", false),
("https://127.0.0.2", false),
("tcp://127.0.0.2:3000", false),
("https://127.0.0.2:3000", false),
// Correct address + port should be ok all other combinations should err
("tcp://172.16.0.2:8000", true),
("https://172.16.0.2:8000", true),
("tcp://172.16.0.2", false),
("https://172.16.0.2", false),
("tcp://172.16.0.2:6000", false),
("https://172.16.0.2:6000", false),
("tcp://172.16.0.1:8000", false),
("https://172.16.0.1:8000", false),
];
for (url_str, is_ok) in url_tests.iter() {
let u = url::Url::parse(url_str).unwrap();
assert_eq!(*is_ok, perms.check_net_url(u).is_ok());
}
for (domain, is_ok) in domain_tests.iter() {
assert_eq!(*is_ok, perms.check_net(domain).is_ok());
}
}
}