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denoland-deno/cli/permissions.rs
Bartek Iwańczuk 0049d4e50c Refactor Worker and ThreadSafeState (#3242)
* Split ThreadSafeState into State and GlobalState. State is a "local"
  state belonging to "Worker" while "GlobalState" is state shared by
  whole program.
* Update "Worker" and ops to use "GlobalState" where applicable
* Move and refactor "WorkerChannels" resource
2019-11-04 10:38:52 -05:00

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// Copyright 2018-2019 the Deno authors. All rights reserved. MIT license.
use crate::deno_error::{permission_denied_msg, type_error};
use crate::flags::DenoFlags;
use ansi_term::Style;
use deno::ErrBox;
use log;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::fmt;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::sync::Arc;
use url::Url;
const PERMISSION_EMOJI: &str = "⚠️";
/// Tri-state value for storing permission state
#[derive(PartialEq)]
pub enum PermissionAccessorState {
Allow = 0,
Ask = 1,
Deny = 2,
}
impl From<usize> for PermissionAccessorState {
fn from(val: usize) -> Self {
match val {
0 => PermissionAccessorState::Allow,
1 => PermissionAccessorState::Ask,
2 => PermissionAccessorState::Deny,
_ => unreachable!(),
}
}
}
impl From<bool> for PermissionAccessorState {
fn from(val: bool) -> Self {
if val {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow
} else {
PermissionAccessorState::Ask
}
}
}
impl fmt::Display for PermissionAccessorState {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
match self {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow => f.pad("granted"),
PermissionAccessorState::Ask => f.pad("prompt"),
PermissionAccessorState::Deny => f.pad("denied"),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct PermissionAccessor {
state: Arc<AtomicUsize>,
}
impl PermissionAccessor {
pub fn new(state: PermissionAccessorState) -> Self {
Self {
state: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(state as usize)),
}
}
pub fn is_allow(&self) -> bool {
match self.get_state() {
PermissionAccessorState::Allow => true,
_ => false,
}
}
/// If the state is "Allow" walk it back to the default "Ask"
/// Don't do anything if state is "Deny"
pub fn revoke(&self) {
if self.is_allow() {
self.ask();
}
}
pub fn allow(&self) {
self.set_state(PermissionAccessorState::Allow)
}
pub fn ask(&self) {
self.set_state(PermissionAccessorState::Ask)
}
#[inline]
pub fn get_state(&self) -> PermissionAccessorState {
self.state.load(Ordering::SeqCst).into()
}
fn set_state(&self, state: PermissionAccessorState) {
self.state.store(state as usize, Ordering::SeqCst)
}
}
impl From<bool> for PermissionAccessor {
fn from(val: bool) -> Self {
Self::new(PermissionAccessorState::from(val))
}
}
impl Default for PermissionAccessor {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
state: Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(PermissionAccessorState::Ask as usize)),
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)]
pub struct DenoPermissions {
// Keep in sync with cli/js/permissions.ts
pub allow_read: PermissionAccessor,
pub read_whitelist: Arc<HashSet<String>>,
pub allow_write: PermissionAccessor,
pub write_whitelist: Arc<HashSet<String>>,
pub allow_net: PermissionAccessor,
pub net_whitelist: Arc<HashSet<String>>,
pub allow_env: PermissionAccessor,
pub allow_run: PermissionAccessor,
pub allow_hrtime: PermissionAccessor,
}
impl DenoPermissions {
pub fn from_flags(flags: &DenoFlags) -> Self {
Self {
allow_read: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_read),
read_whitelist: Arc::new(flags.read_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect()),
allow_write: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_write),
write_whitelist: Arc::new(
flags.write_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect(),
),
allow_net: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_net),
net_whitelist: Arc::new(flags.net_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect()),
allow_env: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_env),
allow_run: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_run),
allow_hrtime: PermissionAccessor::from(flags.allow_hrtime),
}
}
/** Checks the permission state and returns the result. */
fn check_permission_state(
&self,
state: PermissionAccessorState,
msg: &str,
err_msg: &str,
) -> Result<(), ErrBox> {
if state == PermissionAccessorState::Allow {
self.log_perm_access(msg);
return Ok(());
}
Err(permission_denied_msg(err_msg.to_string()))
}
pub fn check_run(&self) -> Result<(), ErrBox> {
self.check_permission_state(
self.allow_run.get_state(),
"access to run a subprocess",
"run again with the --allow-run flag",
)
}
fn get_state_read(&self, filename: &Option<&str>) -> PermissionAccessorState {
if check_path_white_list(filename, &self.read_whitelist) {
return PermissionAccessorState::Allow;
}
self.allow_read.get_state()
}
pub fn check_read(&self, filename: &str) -> Result<(), ErrBox> {
self.check_permission_state(
self.get_state_read(&Some(filename)),
&format!("read access to \"{}\"", filename),
"run again with the --allow-read flag",
)
}
fn get_state_write(
&self,
filename: &Option<&str>,
) -> PermissionAccessorState {
if check_path_white_list(filename, &self.write_whitelist) {
return PermissionAccessorState::Allow;
}
self.allow_write.get_state()
}
pub fn check_write(&self, filename: &str) -> Result<(), ErrBox> {
self.check_permission_state(
self.get_state_write(&Some(filename)),
&format!("write access to \"{}\"", filename),
"run again with the --allow-write flag",
)
}
fn get_state_net(
&self,
host: &str,
port: Option<u16>,
) -> PermissionAccessorState {
if check_host_and_port_whitelist(host, port, &self.net_whitelist) {
return PermissionAccessorState::Allow;
}
self.allow_net.get_state()
}
pub fn check_net(&self, hostname: &str, port: u16) -> Result<(), ErrBox> {
self.check_permission_state(
self.get_state_net(hostname, Some(port)),
&format!("network access to \"{}:{}\"", hostname, port),
"run again with the --allow-net flag",
)
}
pub fn check_net_url(&self, url: &url::Url) -> Result<(), ErrBox> {
self.check_permission_state(
self.get_state_net(&format!("{}", url.host().unwrap()), url.port()),
&format!("network access to \"{}\"", url),
"run again with the --allow-net flag",
)
}
pub fn check_env(&self) -> Result<(), ErrBox> {
self.check_permission_state(
self.allow_env.get_state(),
"access to environment variables",
"run again with the --allow-env flag",
)
}
fn log_perm_access(&self, message: &str) {
if log_enabled!(log::Level::Info) {
eprintln!(
"{}",
Style::new()
.bold()
.paint(format!("{} Granted {}", PERMISSION_EMOJI, message))
);
}
}
pub fn get_permission_state(
&self,
name: &str,
url: &Option<&str>,
path: &Option<&str>,
) -> Result<PermissionAccessorState, ErrBox> {
match name {
"run" => Ok(self.allow_run.get_state()),
"read" => Ok(self.get_state_read(path)),
"write" => Ok(self.get_state_write(path)),
"net" => {
// If url is not given, then just check the entire net permission
if url.is_none() {
return Ok(self.allow_net.get_state());
}
let url: &str = url.unwrap();
// If url is invalid, then throw a TypeError.
let parsed = Url::parse(url)
.map_err(|_| type_error(format!("Invalid url: {}", url)))?;
let state = self
.get_state_net(&format!("{}", parsed.host().unwrap()), parsed.port());
Ok(state)
}
"env" => Ok(self.allow_env.get_state()),
"hrtime" => Ok(self.allow_hrtime.get_state()),
n => Err(type_error(format!("No such permission name: {}", n))),
}
}
}
fn check_path_white_list(
filename: &Option<&str>,
white_list: &Arc<HashSet<String>>,
) -> bool {
if filename.is_none() {
return false;
}
let mut path_buf = PathBuf::from(filename.unwrap());
loop {
if white_list.contains(path_buf.to_str().unwrap()) {
return true;
}
if !path_buf.pop() {
break;
}
}
false
}
fn check_host_and_port_whitelist(
host: &str,
port: Option<u16>,
whitelist: &Arc<HashSet<String>>,
) -> bool {
whitelist.contains(host)
|| (port.is_some()
&& whitelist.contains(&format!("{}:{}", host, port.unwrap())))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
// Creates vector of strings, Vec<String>
macro_rules! svec {
($($x:expr),*) => (vec![$($x.to_string()),*]);
}
#[test]
fn check_paths() {
let whitelist = svec!["/a/specific/dir/name", "/a/specific", "/b/c"];
let perms = DenoPermissions::from_flags(&DenoFlags {
read_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
write_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
..Default::default()
});
// Inside of /a/specific and /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/dir/name").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/dir/name").is_ok());
// Inside of /a/specific but outside of /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/dir").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/dir").is_ok());
// Inside of /a/specific and /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/dir/name/inner").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/dir/name/inner").is_ok());
// Inside of /a/specific but outside of /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms.check_read("/a/specific/other/dir").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/a/specific/other/dir").is_ok());
// Exact match with /b/c
assert!(perms.check_read("/b/c").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/b/c").is_ok());
// Sub path within /b/c
assert!(perms.check_read("/b/c/sub/path").is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write("/b/c/sub/path").is_ok());
// Inside of /b but outside of /b/c
assert!(perms.check_read("/b/e").is_err());
assert!(perms.check_write("/b/e").is_err());
// Inside of /a but outside of /a/specific
assert!(perms.check_read("/a/b").is_err());
assert!(perms.check_write("/a/b").is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_check_net() {
let perms = DenoPermissions::from_flags(&DenoFlags {
net_whitelist: svec![
"localhost",
"deno.land",
"github.com:3000",
"127.0.0.1",
"172.16.0.2:8000"
],
..Default::default()
});
let domain_tests = vec![
("localhost", 1234, true),
("deno.land", 0, true),
("deno.land", 3000, true),
("deno.lands", 0, false),
("deno.lands", 3000, false),
("github.com", 3000, true),
("github.com", 0, false),
("github.com", 2000, false),
("github.net", 3000, false),
("127.0.0.1", 0, true),
("127.0.0.1", 3000, true),
("127.0.0.2", 0, false),
("127.0.0.2", 3000, false),
("172.16.0.2", 8000, true),
("172.16.0.2", 0, false),
("172.16.0.2", 6000, false),
("172.16.0.1", 8000, false),
// Just some random hosts that should err
("somedomain", 0, false),
("192.168.0.1", 0, false),
];
let url_tests = vec![
// Any protocol + port for localhost should be ok, since we don't specify
("http://localhost", true),
("https://localhost", true),
("https://localhost:4443", true),
("tcp://localhost:5000", true),
("udp://localhost:6000", true),
// Correct domain + any port and protocol should be ok incorrect shouldn't
("https://deno.land/std/example/welcome.ts", true),
("https://deno.land:3000/std/example/welcome.ts", true),
("https://deno.lands/std/example/welcome.ts", false),
("https://deno.lands:3000/std/example/welcome.ts", false),
// Correct domain + port should be ok all other combinations should err
("https://github.com:3000/denoland/deno", true),
("https://github.com/denoland/deno", false),
("https://github.com:2000/denoland/deno", false),
("https://github.net:3000/denoland/deno", false),
// Correct ipv4 address + any port should be ok others should err
("tcp://127.0.0.1", true),
("https://127.0.0.1", true),
("tcp://127.0.0.1:3000", true),
("https://127.0.0.1:3000", true),
("tcp://127.0.0.2", false),
("https://127.0.0.2", false),
("tcp://127.0.0.2:3000", false),
("https://127.0.0.2:3000", false),
// Correct address + port should be ok all other combinations should err
("tcp://172.16.0.2:8000", true),
("https://172.16.0.2:8000", true),
("tcp://172.16.0.2", false),
("https://172.16.0.2", false),
("tcp://172.16.0.2:6000", false),
("https://172.16.0.2:6000", false),
("tcp://172.16.0.1:8000", false),
("https://172.16.0.1:8000", false),
];
for (url_str, is_ok) in url_tests.iter() {
let u = url::Url::parse(url_str).unwrap();
assert_eq!(*is_ok, perms.check_net_url(&u).is_ok());
}
for (host, port, is_ok) in domain_tests.iter() {
assert_eq!(*is_ok, perms.check_net(host, *port).is_ok());
}
}
}