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denoland-deno/cli/permissions.rs
Bartek Iwańczuk 32aeec9630
refactor: check permissions in SourceFileFetcher (#5011)
This PR hot-fixes permission escapes in dynamic imports, workers
and runtime compiler APIs.

"permissions" parameter was added to public APIs of SourceFileFetcher
and appropriate permission checks are performed during loading of
local and remote files.
2020-05-11 13:13:27 +02:00

738 lines
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// Copyright 2018-2020 the Deno authors. All rights reserved. MIT license.
use crate::colors;
use crate::flags::Flags;
use crate::op_error::OpError;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::fmt;
#[cfg(not(test))]
use std::io;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
#[cfg(test)]
use std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
#[cfg(test)]
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
#[cfg(test)]
use std::sync::Mutex;
use url::Url;
const PERMISSION_EMOJI: &str = "⚠️";
/// Tri-state value for storing permission state
#[derive(PartialEq, Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub enum PermissionState {
Allow = 0,
Ask = 1,
Deny = 2,
}
impl PermissionState {
/// Checks the permission state and returns the result.
pub fn check(self, msg: &str, flag_name: &str) -> Result<(), OpError> {
if self == PermissionState::Allow {
log_perm_access(msg);
return Ok(());
}
let m = format!("{}, run again with the {} flag", msg, flag_name);
Err(OpError::permission_denied(m))
}
pub fn is_allow(self) -> bool {
self == PermissionState::Allow
}
/// If the state is "Allow" walk it back to the default "Ask"
/// Don't do anything if state is "Deny"
pub fn revoke(&mut self) {
if *self == PermissionState::Allow {
*self = PermissionState::Ask;
}
}
/// Requests the permission.
pub fn request(&mut self, msg: &str) -> PermissionState {
if *self != PermissionState::Ask {
return *self;
}
if permission_prompt(msg) {
*self = PermissionState::Allow;
} else {
*self = PermissionState::Deny;
}
*self
}
}
impl From<usize> for PermissionState {
fn from(val: usize) -> Self {
match val {
0 => PermissionState::Allow,
1 => PermissionState::Ask,
2 => PermissionState::Deny,
_ => unreachable!(),
}
}
}
impl From<bool> for PermissionState {
fn from(val: bool) -> Self {
if val {
PermissionState::Allow
} else {
PermissionState::Ask
}
}
}
impl fmt::Display for PermissionState {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
match self {
PermissionState::Allow => f.pad("granted"),
PermissionState::Ask => f.pad("prompt"),
PermissionState::Deny => f.pad("denied"),
}
}
}
impl Default for PermissionState {
fn default() -> Self {
PermissionState::Ask
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default)]
pub struct Permissions {
// Keep in sync with cli/js/permissions.ts
pub allow_read: PermissionState,
pub read_whitelist: HashSet<PathBuf>,
pub allow_write: PermissionState,
pub write_whitelist: HashSet<PathBuf>,
pub allow_net: PermissionState,
pub net_whitelist: HashSet<String>,
pub allow_env: PermissionState,
pub allow_run: PermissionState,
pub allow_plugin: PermissionState,
pub allow_hrtime: PermissionState,
}
impl Permissions {
pub fn from_flags(flags: &Flags) -> Self {
// assert each whitelist path is absolute, since the cwd may change.
for path in &flags.read_whitelist {
assert!(path.has_root());
}
for path in &flags.write_whitelist {
assert!(path.has_root());
}
Self {
allow_read: PermissionState::from(flags.allow_read),
read_whitelist: flags.read_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect(),
allow_write: PermissionState::from(flags.allow_write),
write_whitelist: flags.write_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect(),
allow_net: PermissionState::from(flags.allow_net),
net_whitelist: flags.net_whitelist.iter().cloned().collect(),
allow_env: PermissionState::from(flags.allow_env),
allow_run: PermissionState::from(flags.allow_run),
allow_plugin: PermissionState::from(flags.allow_plugin),
allow_hrtime: PermissionState::from(flags.allow_hrtime),
}
}
pub fn allow_all() -> Self {
Self {
allow_read: PermissionState::from(true),
allow_write: PermissionState::from(true),
allow_net: PermissionState::from(true),
allow_env: PermissionState::from(true),
allow_run: PermissionState::from(true),
allow_plugin: PermissionState::from(true),
allow_hrtime: PermissionState::from(true),
..Default::default()
}
}
pub fn check_run(&self) -> Result<(), OpError> {
self
.allow_run
.check("access to run a subprocess", "--allow-run")
}
fn get_state_read(&self, path: &Option<&Path>) -> PermissionState {
if path.map_or(false, |f| check_path_white_list(f, &self.read_whitelist)) {
return PermissionState::Allow;
}
self.allow_read
}
pub fn check_read(&self, path: &Path) -> Result<(), OpError> {
self.get_state_read(&Some(path)).check(
&format!("read access to \"{}\"", path.display()),
"--allow-read",
)
}
fn get_state_write(&self, path: &Option<&Path>) -> PermissionState {
if path.map_or(false, |f| check_path_white_list(f, &self.write_whitelist)) {
return PermissionState::Allow;
}
self.allow_write
}
pub fn check_write(&self, path: &Path) -> Result<(), OpError> {
self.get_state_write(&Some(path)).check(
&format!("write access to \"{}\"", path.display()),
"--allow-write",
)
}
fn get_state_net(&self, host: &str, port: Option<u16>) -> PermissionState {
if check_host_and_port_whitelist(host, port, &self.net_whitelist) {
return PermissionState::Allow;
}
self.allow_net
}
fn get_state_net_url(
&self,
url: &Option<&str>,
) -> Result<PermissionState, OpError> {
if url.is_none() {
return Ok(self.allow_net);
}
let url: &str = url.unwrap();
// If url is invalid, then throw a TypeError.
let parsed = Url::parse(url).map_err(OpError::from)?;
Ok(
self.get_state_net(&format!("{}", parsed.host().unwrap()), parsed.port()),
)
}
pub fn check_net(&self, hostname: &str, port: u16) -> Result<(), OpError> {
self.get_state_net(hostname, Some(port)).check(
&format!("network access to \"{}:{}\"", hostname, port),
"--allow-net",
)
}
pub fn check_net_url(&self, url: &url::Url) -> Result<(), OpError> {
let host = url
.host_str()
.ok_or_else(|| OpError::uri_error("missing host".to_owned()))?;
self
.get_state_net(host, url.port())
.check(&format!("network access to \"{}\"", url), "--allow-net")
}
pub fn check_env(&self) -> Result<(), OpError> {
self
.allow_env
.check("access to environment variables", "--allow-env")
}
pub fn check_plugin(&self, path: &Path) -> Result<(), OpError> {
self.allow_plugin.check(
&format!("access to open a plugin: {}", path.display()),
"--allow-plugin",
)
}
pub fn request_run(&mut self) -> PermissionState {
self
.allow_run
.request("Deno requests to access to run a subprocess")
}
pub fn request_read(&mut self, path: &Option<&Path>) -> PermissionState {
if path.map_or(false, |f| check_path_white_list(f, &self.read_whitelist)) {
return PermissionState::Allow;
};
self.allow_read.request(&match path {
None => "Deno requests read access".to_string(),
Some(path) => {
format!("Deno requests read access to \"{}\"", path.display())
}
})
}
pub fn request_write(&mut self, path: &Option<&Path>) -> PermissionState {
if path.map_or(false, |f| check_path_white_list(f, &self.write_whitelist)) {
return PermissionState::Allow;
};
self.allow_write.request(&match path {
None => "Deno requests write access".to_string(),
Some(path) => {
format!("Deno requests write access to \"{}\"", path.display())
}
})
}
pub fn request_net(
&mut self,
url: &Option<&str>,
) -> Result<PermissionState, OpError> {
if self.get_state_net_url(url)? == PermissionState::Ask {
return Ok(self.allow_net.request(&match url {
None => "Deno requests network access".to_string(),
Some(url) => format!("Deno requests network access to \"{}\"", url),
}));
};
self.get_state_net_url(url)
}
pub fn request_env(&mut self) -> PermissionState {
self
.allow_env
.request("Deno requests to access to environment variables")
}
pub fn request_hrtime(&mut self) -> PermissionState {
self
.allow_hrtime
.request("Deno requests to access to high precision time")
}
pub fn request_plugin(&mut self) -> PermissionState {
self.allow_plugin.request("Deno requests to open plugins")
}
pub fn get_permission_state(
&self,
name: &str,
url: &Option<&str>,
path: &Option<&Path>,
) -> Result<PermissionState, OpError> {
match name {
"run" => Ok(self.allow_run),
"read" => Ok(self.get_state_read(path)),
"write" => Ok(self.get_state_write(path)),
"net" => self.get_state_net_url(url),
"env" => Ok(self.allow_env),
"plugin" => Ok(self.allow_plugin),
"hrtime" => Ok(self.allow_hrtime),
n => Err(OpError::other(format!("No such permission name: {}", n))),
}
}
}
/// Shows the permission prompt and returns the answer according to the user input.
/// This loops until the user gives the proper input.
#[cfg(not(test))]
fn permission_prompt(message: &str) -> bool {
if !atty::is(atty::Stream::Stdin) || !atty::is(atty::Stream::Stderr) {
return false;
};
let msg = format!(
"{} {}. Grant? [g/d (g = grant, d = deny)] ",
PERMISSION_EMOJI, message
);
// print to stderr so that if deno is > to a file this is still displayed.
eprint!("{}", colors::bold(msg));
loop {
let mut input = String::new();
let stdin = io::stdin();
let result = stdin.read_line(&mut input);
if result.is_err() {
return false;
};
let ch = input.chars().next().unwrap();
match ch.to_ascii_lowercase() {
'g' => return true,
'd' => return false,
_ => {
// If we don't get a recognized option try again.
let msg_again =
format!("Unrecognized option '{}' [g/d (g = grant, d = deny)] ", ch);
eprint!("{}", colors::bold(msg_again));
}
};
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
lazy_static! {
/// Lock this when you use `set_prompt_result` in a test case.
static ref PERMISSION_PROMPT_GUARD: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
}
#[cfg(test)]
static STUB_PROMPT_VALUE: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(true);
#[cfg(test)]
fn set_prompt_result(value: bool) {
STUB_PROMPT_VALUE.store(value, Ordering::SeqCst);
}
// When testing, permission prompt returns the value of STUB_PROMPT_VALUE
// which we set from the test functions.
#[cfg(test)]
fn permission_prompt(_message: &str) -> bool {
STUB_PROMPT_VALUE.load(Ordering::SeqCst)
}
fn log_perm_access(message: &str) {
debug!(
"{}",
colors::bold(format!("{} Granted {}", PERMISSION_EMOJI, message))
);
}
fn check_path_white_list(path: &Path, white_list: &HashSet<PathBuf>) -> bool {
let mut path_buf = PathBuf::from(path);
loop {
if white_list.contains(&path_buf) {
return true;
}
if !path_buf.pop() {
break;
}
}
false
}
fn check_host_and_port_whitelist(
host: &str,
port: Option<u16>,
whitelist: &HashSet<String>,
) -> bool {
whitelist.contains(host)
|| (port.is_some()
&& whitelist.contains(&format!("{}:{}", host, port.unwrap())))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
// Creates vector of strings, Vec<String>
macro_rules! svec {
($($x:expr),*) => (vec![$($x.to_string()),*]);
}
#[test]
fn check_paths() {
let whitelist = vec![
PathBuf::from("/a/specific/dir/name"),
PathBuf::from("/a/specific"),
PathBuf::from("/b/c"),
];
let perms = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
read_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
write_whitelist: whitelist,
..Default::default()
});
// Inside of /a/specific and /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms.check_read(Path::new("/a/specific/dir/name")).is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write(Path::new("/a/specific/dir/name")).is_ok());
// Inside of /a/specific but outside of /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms.check_read(Path::new("/a/specific/dir")).is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write(Path::new("/a/specific/dir")).is_ok());
// Inside of /a/specific and /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms
.check_read(Path::new("/a/specific/dir/name/inner"))
.is_ok());
assert!(perms
.check_write(Path::new("/a/specific/dir/name/inner"))
.is_ok());
// Inside of /a/specific but outside of /a/specific/dir/name
assert!(perms.check_read(Path::new("/a/specific/other/dir")).is_ok());
assert!(perms
.check_write(Path::new("/a/specific/other/dir"))
.is_ok());
// Exact match with /b/c
assert!(perms.check_read(Path::new("/b/c")).is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write(Path::new("/b/c")).is_ok());
// Sub path within /b/c
assert!(perms.check_read(Path::new("/b/c/sub/path")).is_ok());
assert!(perms.check_write(Path::new("/b/c/sub/path")).is_ok());
// Inside of /b but outside of /b/c
assert!(perms.check_read(Path::new("/b/e")).is_err());
assert!(perms.check_write(Path::new("/b/e")).is_err());
// Inside of /a but outside of /a/specific
assert!(perms.check_read(Path::new("/a/b")).is_err());
assert!(perms.check_write(Path::new("/a/b")).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_check_net() {
let perms = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
net_whitelist: svec![
"localhost",
"deno.land",
"github.com:3000",
"127.0.0.1",
"172.16.0.2:8000"
],
..Default::default()
});
let domain_tests = vec![
("localhost", 1234, true),
("deno.land", 0, true),
("deno.land", 3000, true),
("deno.lands", 0, false),
("deno.lands", 3000, false),
("github.com", 3000, true),
("github.com", 0, false),
("github.com", 2000, false),
("github.net", 3000, false),
("127.0.0.1", 0, true),
("127.0.0.1", 3000, true),
("127.0.0.2", 0, false),
("127.0.0.2", 3000, false),
("172.16.0.2", 8000, true),
("172.16.0.2", 0, false),
("172.16.0.2", 6000, false),
("172.16.0.1", 8000, false),
// Just some random hosts that should err
("somedomain", 0, false),
("192.168.0.1", 0, false),
];
let url_tests = vec![
// Any protocol + port for localhost should be ok, since we don't specify
("http://localhost", true),
("https://localhost", true),
("https://localhost:4443", true),
("tcp://localhost:5000", true),
("udp://localhost:6000", true),
// Correct domain + any port and protocol should be ok incorrect shouldn't
("https://deno.land/std/example/welcome.ts", true),
("https://deno.land:3000/std/example/welcome.ts", true),
("https://deno.lands/std/example/welcome.ts", false),
("https://deno.lands:3000/std/example/welcome.ts", false),
// Correct domain + port should be ok all other combinations should err
("https://github.com:3000/denoland/deno", true),
("https://github.com/denoland/deno", false),
("https://github.com:2000/denoland/deno", false),
("https://github.net:3000/denoland/deno", false),
// Correct ipv4 address + any port should be ok others should err
("tcp://127.0.0.1", true),
("https://127.0.0.1", true),
("tcp://127.0.0.1:3000", true),
("https://127.0.0.1:3000", true),
("tcp://127.0.0.2", false),
("https://127.0.0.2", false),
("tcp://127.0.0.2:3000", false),
("https://127.0.0.2:3000", false),
// Correct address + port should be ok all other combinations should err
("tcp://172.16.0.2:8000", true),
("https://172.16.0.2:8000", true),
("tcp://172.16.0.2", false),
("https://172.16.0.2", false),
("tcp://172.16.0.2:6000", false),
("https://172.16.0.2:6000", false),
("tcp://172.16.0.1:8000", false),
("https://172.16.0.1:8000", false),
];
for (url_str, is_ok) in url_tests.iter() {
let u = url::Url::parse(url_str).unwrap();
assert_eq!(*is_ok, perms.check_net_url(&u).is_ok());
}
for (host, port, is_ok) in domain_tests.iter() {
assert_eq!(*is_ok, perms.check_net(host, *port).is_ok());
}
}
#[test]
fn test_permissions_request_run() {
let guard = PERMISSION_PROMPT_GUARD.lock().unwrap();
let mut perms0 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(true);
assert_eq!(perms0.request_run(), PermissionState::Allow);
let mut perms1 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(false);
assert_eq!(perms1.request_run(), PermissionState::Deny);
drop(guard);
}
#[test]
fn test_permissions_request_read() {
let guard = PERMISSION_PROMPT_GUARD.lock().unwrap();
let whitelist = vec![PathBuf::from("/foo/bar")];
let mut perms0 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
read_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(false);
// If the whitelist contains the path, then the result is `allow`
// regardless of prompt result
assert_eq!(
perms0.request_read(&Some(Path::new("/foo/bar"))),
PermissionState::Allow
);
let mut perms1 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
read_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(true);
assert_eq!(
perms1.request_read(&Some(Path::new("/foo/baz"))),
PermissionState::Allow
);
let mut perms2 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
read_whitelist: whitelist,
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(false);
assert_eq!(
perms2.request_read(&Some(Path::new("/foo/baz"))),
PermissionState::Deny
);
drop(guard);
}
#[test]
fn test_permissions_request_write() {
let guard = PERMISSION_PROMPT_GUARD.lock().unwrap();
let whitelist = vec![PathBuf::from("/foo/bar")];
let mut perms0 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
write_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(false);
// If the whitelist contains the path, then the result is `allow`
// regardless of prompt result
assert_eq!(
perms0.request_write(&Some(Path::new("/foo/bar"))),
PermissionState::Allow
);
let mut perms1 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
write_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(true);
assert_eq!(
perms1.request_write(&Some(Path::new("/foo/baz"))),
PermissionState::Allow
);
let mut perms2 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
write_whitelist: whitelist,
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(false);
assert_eq!(
perms2.request_write(&Some(Path::new("/foo/baz"))),
PermissionState::Deny
);
drop(guard);
}
#[test]
fn test_permission_request_net() {
let guard = PERMISSION_PROMPT_GUARD.lock().unwrap();
let whitelist = svec!["localhost:8080"];
let mut perms0 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
net_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(false);
// If the url matches the whitelist item, then the result is `allow`
// regardless of prompt result
assert_eq!(
perms0
.request_net(&Some("http://localhost:8080/"))
.expect("Testing expect"),
PermissionState::Allow
);
let mut perms1 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
net_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(true);
assert_eq!(
perms1
.request_net(&Some("http://deno.land/"))
.expect("Testing expect"),
PermissionState::Allow
);
let mut perms2 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
net_whitelist: whitelist.clone(),
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(false);
assert_eq!(
perms2
.request_net(&Some("http://deno.land/"))
.expect("Testing expect"),
PermissionState::Deny
);
let mut perms3 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
net_whitelist: whitelist,
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(true);
assert!(perms3.request_net(&Some(":")).is_err());
drop(guard);
}
#[test]
fn test_permissions_request_env() {
let guard = PERMISSION_PROMPT_GUARD.lock().unwrap();
let mut perms0 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(true);
assert_eq!(perms0.request_env(), PermissionState::Allow);
let mut perms1 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(false);
assert_eq!(perms1.request_env(), PermissionState::Deny);
drop(guard);
}
#[test]
fn test_permissions_request_plugin() {
let guard = PERMISSION_PROMPT_GUARD.lock().unwrap();
let mut perms0 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(true);
assert_eq!(perms0.request_plugin(), PermissionState::Allow);
let mut perms1 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(false);
assert_eq!(perms1.request_plugin(), PermissionState::Deny);
drop(guard);
}
#[test]
fn test_permissions_request_hrtime() {
let guard = PERMISSION_PROMPT_GUARD.lock().unwrap();
let mut perms0 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(true);
assert_eq!(perms0.request_hrtime(), PermissionState::Allow);
let mut perms1 = Permissions::from_flags(&Flags {
..Default::default()
});
set_prompt_result(false);
assert_eq!(perms1.request_hrtime(), PermissionState::Deny);
drop(guard);
}
}