If a repository has
git config --add push.pushOption submit=".sourcehut/*.yml"
it failed when pushed because of the unknown submit push
option. It will be ignored instead.
Filtering out the push options is done in an earlier stage, when the
hook command runs, before it submits the options map to the private
endpoint.
* move all the push options logic to modules/git/pushoptions
* add 100% test coverage for modules/git/pushoptions
Test coverage for the code paths from which code was moved to the
modules/git/pushoptions package:
* cmd/hook.go:runHookPreReceive
* routers/private/hook_pre_receive.go:validatePushOptions
tests/integration/git_push_test.go:TestOptionsGitPush runs through
both. The test verifying the option is rejected was removed and, if
added again, will fail because the option is now ignored instead of
being rejected.
* cmd/hook.go:runHookProcReceive
* services/agit/agit.go:ProcReceive
tests/integration/git_test.go: doCreateAgitFlowPull runs through
both. It uses variations of AGit related push options.
* cmd/hook.go:runHookPostReceive
* routers/private/hook_post_receive.go:HookPostReceive
tests/integration/git_test.go:doPushCreate called by TestGit/HTTP/sha1/PushCreate
runs through both.
Note that although it provides coverage for this code path it does not use push options.
Fixes: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/issues/3651
(cherry picked from commit 5561e80b04)
(cherry picked from commit 5c1b550e00e9460078e00c41a32d206b260ef482)
Conflicts:
tests/integration/git_push_test.go
trivial context conflict because of
2ac3dcbd43 test: hook post-receive for sha256 repos
It is possible to change some repo settings (its visibility, and
template status) via `git push` options: `-o repo.private=true`, `-o
repo.template=true`.
Previously, there weren't sufficient permission checks on these, and
anyone who could `git push` to a repository - including via an AGit
workflow! - was able to change either of these settings. To guard
against this, the pre-receive hook will now check if either of these
options are present, and if so, will perform additional permission
checks to ensure that these can only be set by a repository owner or
an administrator. Additionally, changing these settings is disabled for
forks, even for the fork's owner.
There's still a case where the owner of a repository can change the
visibility of it, and it will not propagate to forks (it propagates to
forks when changing the visibility via the API), but that's an
inconsistency, not a security issue.
Signed-off-by: Gergely Nagy <forgejo@gergo.csillger.hu>
Signed-off-by: Earl Warren <contact@earl-warren.org>
Regression of #29493. If a branch has been deleted, repushing it won't
restore it.
Lunny may have noticed that, but I didn't delve into the comment then
overlooked it:
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/29493#discussion_r1509046867
The additional comments added are to explain the issue I found during
testing, which are unrelated to the fixes.
(cherry picked from commit f371f84fa3456c2a71470632b6458d81e4892a54)
Unlike other async processing in the queue, we should sync branches to
the DB immediately when handling git hook calling. If it fails, users
can see the error message in the output of the git command.
It can avoid potential inconsistency issues, and help #29494.
---------
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
