mirror of
https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo.git
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03508b33a8
- Continuation of https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/18835 (by @Gusted, so it's fine to change copyright holder to Forgejo). - Add the option to use SSH for push mirrors, this would allow for the deploy keys feature to be used and not require tokens to be used which cannot be limited to a specific repository. The private key is stored encrypted (via the `keying` module) on the database and NEVER given to the user, to avoid accidental exposure and misuse. - CAVEAT: This does require the `ssh` binary to be present, which may not be available in containerized environments, this could be solved by adding a SSH client into forgejo itself and use the forgejo binary as SSH command, but should be done in another PR. - CAVEAT: Mirroring of LFS content is not supported, this would require the previous stated problem to be solved due to LFS authentication (an attempt was made at forgejo/forgejo#2544). - Integration test added. - Resolves #4416
125 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
125 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2024 The Forgejo Authors. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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// Keying is a module that allows for subkeys to be determistically generated
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// from the same master key. It allows for domain seperation to take place by
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// using new keys for new subsystems/domains. These subkeys are provided with
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// an API to encrypt and decrypt data. The module panics if a bad interaction
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// happened, the panic should be seen as an non-recoverable error.
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//
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// HKDF (per RFC 5869) is used to derive new subkeys in a safe manner. It
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// provides a KDF security property, which is required for Forgejo, as the
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// secret key would be an ASCII string and isn't a random uniform bit string.
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// XChaCha-Poly1305 (per draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01) is used as AEAD to encrypt
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// and decrypt messages. A new fresh random nonce is generated for every
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// encryption. The nonce gets prepended to the ciphertext.
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package keying
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import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/binary"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf"
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)
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var (
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// The hash used for HKDF.
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hash = sha256.New
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// The AEAD used for encryption/decryption.
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aead = chacha20poly1305.NewX
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aeadKeySize = chacha20poly1305.KeySize
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aeadNonceSize = chacha20poly1305.NonceSizeX
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// The pseudorandom key generated by HKDF-Extract.
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prk []byte
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)
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// Set the main IKM for this module.
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func Init(ikm []byte) {
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// Salt is intentionally left empty, it's not useful to Forgejo's use case.
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prk = hkdf.Extract(hash, ikm, nil)
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}
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// Specifies the context for which a subkey should be derived for.
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// This must be a hardcoded string and must not be arbitrarily constructed.
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type Context string
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// Used for the `push_mirror` table.
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var ContextPushMirror Context = "pushmirror"
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// Derive *the* key for a given context, this is a determistic function. The
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// same key will be provided for the same context.
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func DeriveKey(context Context) *Key {
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if len(prk) == 0 {
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panic("keying: not initialized")
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}
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r := hkdf.Expand(hash, prk, []byte(context))
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key := make([]byte, aeadKeySize)
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// This should never return an error, but if it does, panic.
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if _, err := r.Read(key); err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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return &Key{key}
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}
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type Key struct {
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key []byte
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}
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// Encrypts the specified plaintext with some additional data that is tied to
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// this plaintext. The additional data can be seen as the context in which the
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// data is being encrypted for, this is different than the context for which the
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// key was derrived this allows for more granuality without deriving new keys.
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// Avoid any user-generated data to be passed into the additional data. The most
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// common usage of this would be to encrypt a database field, in that case use
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// the ID and database column name as additional data. The additional data isn't
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// appended to the ciphertext and may be publicly known, it must be available
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// when decryping the ciphertext.
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func (k *Key) Encrypt(plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
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// Construct a new AEAD with the key.
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e, err := aead(k.key)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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// Generate a random nonce.
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nonce := make([]byte, aeadNonceSize)
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if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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// Returns the ciphertext of this plaintext.
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return e.Seal(nonce, nonce, plaintext, additionalData)
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}
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// Decrypts the ciphertext and authenticates it against the given additional
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// data that was given when it was encrypted. It returns an error if the
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// authentication failed.
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func (k *Key) Decrypt(ciphertext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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if len(ciphertext) <= aeadNonceSize {
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panic("keying: ciphertext is too short")
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}
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e, err := aead(k.key)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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nonce, ciphertext := ciphertext[:aeadNonceSize], ciphertext[aeadNonceSize:]
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return e.Open(nil, nonce, ciphertext, additionalData)
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}
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// ColumnAndID generates a context that can be used as additional context for
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// encrypting and decrypting data. It requires the column name and the row ID
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// (this requires to be known beforehand). Be careful when using this, as the
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// table name isn't part of this context. This means it's not bound to a
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// particular table. The table should be part of the context that the key was
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// derived for, in which case it binds through that.
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func ColumnAndID(column string, id int64) []byte {
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return binary.BigEndian.AppendUint64(append([]byte(column), ':'), uint64(id))
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}
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