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Deno does not cover storage explosion attacks from evaluated runtime code. I've chosen the following parts for this clarification: - _Evaluated_ code - storage explosion attacks caused by services in Deno such as the HTTP server should still be covered. - Isolated - If the storage explosion attack can happen at arbitrary different files, it may leave a much more lasting impact on a targeted host system than on simply the Deno cache.
64 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
64 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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Thank you for taking the time to investigate the security of Deno. The security
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of Deno is our topmost priority. We appreciate investigative work into system
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security by well-intentioned, ethical security researchers. If you discover a
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vulnerability, however small, we would like to know about it to address it with
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appropriate measures as quickly as possible. This document outlines the method
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we use to work with the security research community to address runtime security.
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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Please email findings to security@deno.com. We strive to resolve all problems as
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quickly as possible, and are more than happy to play an active role in
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publication of writeups after the problem is resolved.
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Try to include as much information as possible in the initial email, so we can
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quickly address the issue.
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**Please do not open security issues in the public issue tracker.**
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### Please do the following
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- Do not take advantage of the vulnerability or problem you have discovered.
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- Do not publish or reveal the problem until it has been resolved.
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- Do not use attacks on physical security or applications of third parties.
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- Do provide sufficient information to reproduce the problem, so we will be able
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to resolve it as quickly as possible. Usually, a list of steps to follow, and
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the vulnerable Deno version is enough. More complex vulnerabilities may
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require further explanation.
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### Our commitment to you
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- If you act in accordance with this policy, we will not take legal action
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against you in regard to your report.
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- We will handle your report with strict confidentiality, and not pass on your
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personal details to third parties without your permission.
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## Security Model
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The following paragraphs outline the rough security model for Deno. The model
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may change slightly over time, but in general the model is as follows:
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- All JavaScript run in Deno is considered untrusted, so permissions are thus
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never enforced in JavaScript.
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- All JavaScript run in a single Deno process is considered to be part of the
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same program and is not isolated from itself. This means that Deno does not
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guarantee that values set by one JS module will be inaccessible to another, or
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that a value set in one web worker can not be accessed by another.
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- All runtime I/O is considered to be privileged and must always be guarded by a
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runtime permission. This includes filesystem access, network access, etc.
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- The only exception to this is runtime storage explosion attacks that are
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isolated to a part of the file system, caused by evaluated code (for
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example, caching big dependencies or no limits on runtime caches such as the
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[Web Cache](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Cache) API).
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- Users should not be able to self-escalate their permissions without explicit
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consent.
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- I/O required to build an initial static module graph should always follow the
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permissions of its parent. If there is no parent, all permissions are granted.
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As an example, this means that the initial static module graph that is
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constructed when doing `deno run`, does not have any permission restrictions.
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However, the module graph constructed as the result of loading a web worker or
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dynamic import will be restricted to the permissions of the caller (the main
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worker most likely).
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- We consider the V8 VM to be a secure sandbox.
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