- `GetSubModules` already solely stores the URL of the submodule and not
a `*SubModule` entry, so don't try to type assert it to be a struct.
- I am not able to pinpoint when this was regressed but if I had to
guess it might be #4941.
- Added integration test.
(cherry picked from commit e7cffc378f)
Confine the search menu to be at most the width of the page, or 80% of
the viewport width, whichever is smaller. To do this, introduce a new
`--container-width` variable for the descendant elements of
`.ui.container` to be able to access.
Also update the relevant e2e test: add a long 'lorem ipsum' page, add a
search for it, parameterize the width.
- In the case that Enry correctly recognized the language, but returns
the language name in a way that isn't recognized by enry. Although
overkill I've added a map such that new entries should be easier to add.
- Resolves #6077
- Added unit test
(cherry picked from commit 7aeb1ba1d5)
Replace wiki page filenames with page titles in the search results,
fixing the problem with them showing unreadable URI-encoded names.
(cherry picked from commit fc31fa0eeb)
We have some actions that leverage the Gitea API that began receiving
401 errors, with a message that the user was not found. These actions
use the `ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN` env var in the actions job to
authenticate with the Gitea API. The format of this env var in actions
jobs changed with go-gitea/gitea/pull/28885 to be a JWT (with a
corresponding update to `act_runner`) Since it was a JWT, the OAuth
parsing logic attempted to parse it as an OAuth token, and would return
user not found, instead of falling back to look up the running task and
assigning it to the actions user.
Make ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN in action runners could be used,
attempting to parse Oauth JWTs. The code to parse potential old
`ACTION_RUNTIME_TOKEN` was kept in case someone is running an older
version of act_runner that doesn't support the Actions JWT.
(cherry picked from commit 407b6e6dfc7ee9ebb8a16c7f1a786e4c24d0516e)
Conflicts:
services/auth/oauth2.go
trivial context conflicts because OAuth2 scopes are in Forgejo and
not yet in Gitea
(cherry picked from commit 33850a83fe4ebd23a762a7aac81614c42e303bfa)
This really is just the cherry pick of 407b6e6dfc7ee9ebb8a16c7f1a786e4c24d0516e
which is the first commit of the pull request, the one with the
change. The rest of the changes is a refactor that is unrelated to the
bug fix.
Conflicts:
modules/git/commit_test.go
trivial context conflict
Early cancelation can lead to two kinds of error. Either canceled or
broken pipe, depending on when the goroutine stops.
Fixes: forgejo/forgejo#6012
(cherry picked from commit b9697f5227)
- Only send a review request based on the code owner file if the code
owner user has read permissions to the pull requests of that repository.
- This avoids leaking title of PRs from private repository when a
CODEOWNER file is present which contains users that do not have access
to the private repository.
- Found by @oliverpool.
- Integration test added.
(cherry picked from commit 693f7731f9)
- Instead of having code that relied on the result being sorted (which
wasn't specified in the query and therefore not safe to assume so). Use
a map where it doesn't care if the result that we get from the database
is sorted or not.
- Added unit test.
(cherry picked from commit e4eb82b738)
- When RS256, RS384, ES384, ES512 was specified as the JWT signing
algorithm they would generate RS512 and ES256 respectively.
- Added unit test.
(cherry picked from commit 7d59060dc6)
- This unifies the security behavior of enrolling security keys with
enrolling TOTP as a 2FA method. When TOTP is enrolled, you cannot use
basic authorization (user:password) to make API request on behalf of the
user, this is now also the case when you enroll security keys.
- The usage of access tokens are the only method to make API requests on
behalf of the user when a 2FA method is enrolled for the user.
- Integration test added.
(cherry picked from commit e6bbecb02d)
- Add a `purpose` column, this allows the `forgejo_auth_token` table to
be used by other parts of Forgejo, while still enjoying the
no-compromise architecture.
- Remove the 'roll your own crypto' time limited code functions and
migrate them to the `forgejo_auth_token` table. This migration ensures
generated codes can only be used for their purpose and ensure they are
invalidated after their usage by deleting it from the database, this
also should help making auditing of the security code easier, as we're
no longer trying to stuff a lot of data into a HMAC construction.
-Helper functions are rewritten to ensure a safe-by-design approach to
these tokens.
- Add the `forgejo_auth_token` to dbconsistency doctor and add it to the
`deleteUser` function.
- TODO: Add cron job to delete expired authorization tokens.
- Unit and integration tests added.
(cherry picked from commit 1ce33aa38d)
v9: Removed migration - XORM can handle this case automatically without
migration. Add `DEFAULT 'long_term_authorization'`.
- If the incoming mail feature is enabled, tokens are being sent with
outgoing mails. These tokens contains information about what type of
action is allow with such token (such as replying to a certain issue
ID), to verify these tokens the code uses the HMAC-SHA256 construction.
- The output of the HMAC is truncated to 80 bits, because this is
recommended by RFC2104, but RFC2104 actually doesn't recommend this. It
recommends, if truncation should need to take place, it should use
max(80, hash_len/2) of the leftmost bits. For HMAC-SHA256 this works out
to 128 bits instead of the currently used 80 bits.
- Update to token version 2 and disallow any usage of token version 1,
token version 2 are generated with 128 bits of HMAC output.
- Add test to verify the deprecation of token version 1 and a general
MAC check test.
(cherry picked from commit 9508aa7713)
- _Simply_ add `^$` to regexp that didn't had it yet, this avoids any
content being allowed that simply had the allowed content as a
substring.
- Fix file-preview regex to have `$` instead of `*`.
(cherry picked from commit 7067cc7da4)
v9: added fix for ref-issue, this is already fixed in forgejo branch but
not backported as it was part of a feature.
- Consider private/limited users in the `AccessibleRepositoryCondition`
query, previously this only considered private/limited organization.
This limits the ability for anomynous users to do code search on
private/limited user's repository
- Unit test added.
(cherry picked from commit b70196653f)
- The RSS and atom feed for branches exposes details about the code, it
therefore should be guarded by the requirement that the doer has access
to the code of that repository.
- Added integration testing.
(cherry picked from commit 3e3ef76808)
